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ABSTRACT 
  This Article explores the appropriate role of the executive branch 
in enforcing and defending federal statutes that the president, or 
executive-branch officials, believe may well be unconstitutional, but 
for whose constitutional validity reasonable arguments can be 
advanced. The Article first locates the question of the scope of the 
executive branch’s responsibility to enforce and defend federal 
statutes in the larger debate about the extent to which political 
branches of government are authorized—or even obligated—to make 
determinations of constitutionality independently of the views of the 
judiciary. It then reviews the historical practice of the executive 
branch in defending federal statutes—both the very strong 
presumption that statutes will be enforced and in turn defended if 
challenged in court and the departures from that general practice. The 
Article then considers a range of institutional practices and norms that 
are significant in considering the question. A number of 
considerations—including the distinctive capacities of the executive 
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branch, the relationship between career lawyers and political 
appointees in the executive branch, the virtues of institutional 
continuity within the executive branch, and the relationship between 
the executive branch and Congress—reinforce the wisdom of the 
conventional practice of defending even those statutes that an 
incumbent administration views as offensive and possibly invalid. 
Moreover, a regime in which each administration views itself as 
having significant latitude to refuse to enforce and defend acts of 
Congress would be considerably less attractive than particular 
decisions or theories, given that different administrations are likely to 
have sharply different views about the appropriate occasions for, and 
the appropriate theories underlying, a refusal to enforce or defend 
federal statutes. In a world featuring an extremely broad range of 
views about proper constitutional interpretation, partisan correlates to 
those views, a powerful temptation to equate what is misguided or 
immoral with what is unconstitutional, increased polarization of the 
political parties, and a lack of commitment to the idea of judicial 
restraint, decisions not to defend or enforce have the capacity to 
contribute significantly to the unraveling of the executive branch’s 
practice of defending federal statutes. This Article also examines the 
responsibility of the judiciary to provide the executive branch with the 
operating room that it needs to be able to defend, candidly and with 
integrity, statutes with whose premises the president and his 
administration strongly disagree. In the end, the question of the 
executive branch’s responsibility to enforce and defend statutes is not 
governed by a legal rule derivable from the Constitution itself, but is a 
matter of judgment, informed by a welter of historical and 
institutional concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Taft is said to have once described a constitutional 
lawyer as “one who had abandoned the practice of the law and had 
gone into politics.”1 Taft would thus view it as redundant to say that 
my topic concerns constitutional politics. Indeed, it concerns what 
one might call applied constitutional politics or, more broadly, norms 
of constitutional culture. I will discuss the scope of the executive 
branch’s responsibility to enforce and defend statutes that it views as 
misguided, offensive, and very possibly unconstitutional. 
My focus is on the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy that bans openly 
gay or lesbian individuals from serving in the military2 and the section 
of the Defense of Marriage Act3—commonly called DOMA—that 
denies same-sex spouses, lawfully married under state law, a broad set 
of federal benefits.4 These are provisions that President Obama urged 
be repealed5 and that several, though by no means all, lower courts 
have ruled unconstitutional.6 
 
 1. 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 625 (1951) (quoting Charles Evans 
Hughes).  
 2. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 571, 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) 
(2006) (listing the conditions under which a service member must be discharged for 
homosexuality). The precise statutory proscription is somewhat more complex than the 
statement in text. 
 3. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
 4. Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). Section 2 of that Act, which provides 
that no state must give effect to any act, record, or judicial proceeding of another state 
respecting a same-sex marriage, raises distinct issues. Id. § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 5. See, e.g., President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 
on the State of the Union, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. DCPD201000055, at 11 (Jan. 27, 2010) 
(“This year, I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal the law that denies gay 
Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who they are.”); President Barack 
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After I began working on this Lecture, Congress enacted 
legislation under which a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was likely 
to take effect in 2011.7 (The repeal of the policy ultimately took effect 
on September 20, 2011.8) And then, six weeks ago, the attorney 
general announced that the Obama administration would no longer 
defend DOMA.9 It seems that, despite my best efforts, I have 
stumbled into topicality. 
My discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, I locate the question 
of the scope of the executive branch’s responsibility to enforce and 
defend federal statutes in the larger debate about the extent to which 
the political branches of government are authorized—or even 
obligated—to make determinations of constitutionality independently 
of the views of the judiciary. In Part II, I discuss more specifically the 
historical practice of the executive branch in defending federal 
statutes—both the very strong presumption that statutes will be 
enforced and in turn defended if challenged in court and the 
departures from that general practice. In Part III, I turn to evaluating 
whether the government should enforce and defend statutes in light 
of a variety of institutional realities in the operation of the 
government. I contend that a range of considerations, including the 
distinctive capacities of the executive branch, the nature of relations 
between career lawyers and political appointees in the government, 
the virtues of institutional continuity within the executive branch, and 
 
Obama, Remarks on Signing a Memorandum on Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 847, 848 (June 17, 2009) (“Among the steps we have not yet taken is to repeal the 
Defense of Marriage Act. I believe it’s discriminatory, I think it interferes with States’ rights, 
and we will work with Congress to overturn it.”); Jen Colletta, Obama Unveils LGBT Priorities 
List, PHILA. GAY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.epgn.com/view/full_story/736919/article-
Obama-unveils-LGBT-priorities-list (reporting President-elect Obama’s plans to urge the 
repeal of both Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA). 
 6. See infra note 140. 
 7. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Under 
that Act, the effective date of repeal is sixty days after the president has transmitted to the 
congressional defense committees a certification, signed by the president, the secretary of 
defense, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, stating that implementation by the 
Defense Department of the policies and regulations necessary to effect a repeal is consistent 
with military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention of the 
armed forces. Id. § 2(b), 124 Stat. at 3516. 
 8. President Barack Obama, Statement on the Repeal of the Department of Defense’s 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. DCPD201100653 (July 22, 
2011). 
 9. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Representative John 
A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
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the relationship between the executive branch and Congress, 
reinforce the wisdom of the conventional practice of providing a 
defense even of statutes that the incumbent administration views as 
offensive and possibly invalid. In Part IV, I consider the matter from 
a higher level of generality, asking what would happen under a regime 
in which each administration views itself as having significant latitude 
to refuse to enforce and defend acts of Congress. Such a regime, I 
contend, is likely to be less attractive than any particular decisions, 
for a very simple but important reason: different administrations are 
likely to have sharply different views about the appropriate occasions 
for, and the appropriate theories underlying, a refusal to enforce or 
defend federal statutes. In a world featuring an extremely broad 
range of views about proper constitutional interpretation, partisan 
correlates to those views, a powerful temptation to equate what is 
misguided or immoral with what is unconstitutional, increased 
polarization of the political parties, and little commitment to the idea 
of judicial restraint, decisions not to defend or enforce have the 
capacity to contribute significantly to the unraveling of the executive 
branch’s practice of defending federal statutes. Finally, in Part V, I 
examine the responsibility of the judiciary to provide the executive 
branch with the operating room that it needs to be able to defend, 
candidly and with integrity, statutes with whose premises the 
president and his administration strongly disagree. 
I.  DEPARTMENTALISM AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
The question of the executive’s proper role in enforcing and 
defending statutes implicates the broader debate about the proper 
role of the executive branch in making constitutional determinations 
and the relationship of the executive’s constitutional interpretations 
to those of the courts. That larger debate has focused primarily on 
whether the executive may take action that the courts have deemed to 
be unconstitutional. For example, Chief Justice Taney ruled that 
President Lincoln lacked the power unilaterally to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus;10 just over a century later, the Supreme Court ordered 
President Nixon to comply with a grand jury subpoena issued in 
connection with the Watergate investigation.11 Suppose President 
Lincoln and President Nixon both believed the courts got the 
 
 10. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
 11. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974). 
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Constitution wrong. Must they nonetheless honor the courts’ 
decisions? If so, is any obligation limited to complying with specific 
orders, as Lincoln famously suggested,12 or must the executive more 
broadly follow the doctrines laid down by the courts? 
This debate pits two competing views against each other. The 
first view, often called judicial supremacy, asserts that the executive 
must treat the courts’ constitutional interpretations as authoritative.13 
Although no canonical definition of judicial supremacy exists, I use 
the phrase as calling for the political branches to conform their 
conduct to the rules, including the reasoning, of judicial decisions, 
particularly those of the Supreme Court—even if those decisions, in 
turn, sometimes exhibit deference to the positions of the political 
branches.14 Judicial supremacy is premised on some combination of 
the need for a single, authoritative settlement function,15 a belief that 
only the judiciary serves as a forum of constitutional principle,16 the 
related view that only the courts can serve the countermajoritarian 
role of protecting individual rights and political minorities,17 and an 
even more generalized sense that courts are particularly good at 
constitutional interpretation.18 The idea of judicial supremacy does 
not preclude other branches from making constitutional 
determinations; rather, it holds that the other branches should rest 
their determinations on the constitutional views set forth in judicial 
decisions. 
 
 12. See President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in S. 
DOC. NO. 101-10, at 133, 139 (1989); see also Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 
TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987). 
 13. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 1–
13 (2007). See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (arguing that the settlement of contested 
constitutional issues can be achieved only if the judiciary holds the ultimate interpretive role). 
 14. Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections 
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 780 (2002) (suggesting that judicial supremacy also entails 
little judicial deference to the constitutional judgments of the political branches when reviewing 
executive or congressional action). 
 15. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 13, at 1377. 
 16. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985). 
 17. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 14, at 827–28 (describing, without endorsing, this 
view). 
 18. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 13, at 1–13. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional 
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004) (proposing a cooperative form of interbranch 
constitutional interpretation in which each branch recognizes the strengths of the others). 
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The rival view, known as departmentalism, asserts that the 
executive has a coordinate, indeed equal, role in interpreting the 
Constitution. Supporters of departmentalism often root their position 
in historical materials19 or in a conception of the three branches as 
having equal responsibility for interpretation of the Constitution.20 In 
addition, some supporters of departmentalism have argued that the 
political branches have a distinctive capacity to provide constitutional 
interpretations that, as compared to those of the judicial branch, are 
less technical and formulaic and are better grounded in currents of 
political justice, popular will, and constitutional culture.21 
The question whether to enforce or defend Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell and DOMA differs sharply from the situations most frequently 
discussed in this classic debate. The executive, if it refused to defend 
or enforce these statutes, would not be violating anyone’s 
constitutional rights; the Constitution does not prohibit gay and 
lesbian individuals from serving in the military or married same-sex 
couples from receiving federal benefits. Instead, the executive would 
simply be taking a view of the Constitution not authoritatively 
recognized by the courts,22 as past presidents have sometimes done. 
President Jefferson ended pending prosecutions under the Sedition 
Act23 and pardoned individuals previously convicted under that Act,24 
even though the courts had upheld the Act’s constitutionality.25 
Writing to Abigail Adams in 1804, Jefferson said that although judges 
who believed the Sedition Act to be constitutional had a right to 
 
 19. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To 
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228–62 (1994). 
 20. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 5–6 (1938); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 918, 924–25 (1990). 
 21. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to 
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 355 (1994); Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
63, 72 & n.37 (1999); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
1946 (2003); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of 
Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 418 (1993); see also infra text accompanying notes 
131–47. 
 22. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1224–25 (2006). 
 23. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). Although it expired on the date of the 
inauguration of the next president (March 3, 1801), the Sedition Act provided that the 
expiration would “not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of any offense against 
the law, during the time it [was] in force.” Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 597. 
 24. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 73 (2004). 
 25. Id. at 68. 
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impose sentences, “nothing in the Constitution ha[d] given them a 
right to decide for the Executive.”26 Some years later, President 
Jackson took a similar view of the executive’s responsibility when he 
vetoed the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States, resting on a 
constitutional objection—Congress’s lack of legislative authority—
that the Supreme Court had rejected in McCulloch v. Maryland.27 
But these examples still differ from the issues presented by Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA. First, neither President Jefferson nor 
President Jackson refused to defend a statute in pending litigation. 
Indeed, President Jackson’s veto prevented the bank bill from 
becoming law.28 As for President Jefferson, it can hardly be said that 
his pardons disregarded a duty to enforce or defend a congressional 
statute, given that the pardon power, by its nature, involves undoing 
the prior enforcement, via conviction, of a statute. And although the 
abatement of pending prosecutions failed in one sense to enforce the 
Sedition Act, given the breadth of prosecutorial discretion—whether 
rooted in the Constitution, in the presumed intention of Congress, or 
in some combination of the two29—it is hard to view Jefferson as 
having disregarded a congressional mandate. There is no parallel 
tradition under which the decision whether to follow the prescriptions 
of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA has been broadly committed to 
executive discretion.30 
 
 26. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), reprinted in 
8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 n.1, 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897). 
 27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also President Andrew 
Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1144 (James D. Richardson ed., n.p., Bureau of Nat’l Literature 1897) 
(“It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought 
to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this 
conclusion I can not assent.”). 
 28. Although presidential vetoes have come to be most often based on policy 
disagreements, in the early Republic they most frequently rested on constitutional concerns. See 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 13, at 170–87. 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 832 (1985); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 532 (1996). 
 30. Exceptions to the generalization stated in text may exist. For example, DOMA has 
applications in immigration enforcement, an area in which broad discretion is vested in the 
executive. After this Lecture was delivered, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security 
stated that the Obama administration would not grant relief to the entire category of cases 
affected by DOMA, but that it would continue to exercise discretion in individual cases based 
on the particular factors of each situation; the administration did not specify, however, whether 
a same-sex marriage is a factor that weighs in favor of the exercise of discretionary relief. See 
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In analyzing the executive’s duty to enforce and defend statutes, 
the start of wisdom comes in recognizing two points. First, the 
executive makes constitutional decisions in a broad range of settings: 
they include recommending, opposing, or vetoing legislation; starting 
or ending a prosecution or issuing a pardon; responding to court 
orders; defending statutes in litigation; and nominating judges to the 
bench. The appropriate scope of independent executive judgment 
varies across these settings. On the one hand, most commentators, 
even those generally subscribing to departmentalism, concede that 
the president may not defy a judicial order to comply with (the court’s 
interpretation of) the Constitution;31 on the other, even the most 
dedicated judicial supremacist would not doubt that the president 
 
Letter from Nelson Peacock, Assistant Sec’y, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. & Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Senator John Kerry 1 (May 17, 2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(“Neither DHS nor DOJ has granted any form of relief to the entire category of cases affected 
by DOMA.”). One newspaper reported that after the decision to refuse to defend DOMA, the 
administration cancelled the deportation of a male alien who was married to an American man, 
on the basis that the alien’s deportation “[wa]s not an enforcement priority at this time.” Kirk 
Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings Against Immigrant in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16. Some weeks later, another newspaper criticized an immigration 
decision denying an alien permission to petition for permanent residency status based on his 
same-sex marriage. Editorial, Couple Without a Country, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2011, at A14; 
see also Revelis v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 1991, 2012 WL 28765, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012) 
(denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in a lawsuit by a same-sex couple 
challenging DOMA in the context of an immigration hearing). 
 31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 259–65 (1962); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 
182–88 (2003); Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 926; David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s 
“Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 312 (1992); John Harrison, 
Judicial Interpretive Finality and the Constitutional Text, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 42 (2006); 
Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 
153–54 (1999); Meese, supra note 12, at 987 n.26; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as 
Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008–09 (1965). 
 A few commentators do contend that the president may properly defy a judgment. See, 
e.g., Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 1, 12 n.40 (2007); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1313–29 (1996); Paulsen, supra note 19, 
at 276–84. For a nuanced discussion contending that there is “no perfect solution” to the 
allocation of power between courts and the president, that all things considered, the best 
solution is to recognize that judgments bind the executive, that there may be rare cases in which 
the executive is morally justified in defying judgments, and that ultimately the responsibility for 
executive compliance with judgments rests with “Congress and the people,” see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Lecture, Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1. See 
generally William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008) (arguing that the 
president must enforce judgments of the judiciary unless the issuing court lacked jurisdiction). 
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may nominate judges whose views depart from those prevailing on 
the Supreme Court. 
The second point is that Congress, too, is a department of 
government, and when it passes bills, it makes a determination that 
they are constitutional, at least implicitly—and in the case of both 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA, explicitly.32 Thereafter, when a 
legislative act is challenged in court as unconstitutional, the legal 
defense is not provided by Congress, the body that enacted it,33 but by 
the executive. Thus, the question of the executive’s obligation to 
enforce and defend implicates Article II’s requirement that the 
president “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”34 
Here, as elsewhere, the implications of the Take Care Clause35 
are disputed. Some have argued that a president must defend a 
statute with all his powers unless and until the courts bar 
enforcement. That view was voiced, for example, by Representative 
George Boutwell, one of the House managers of the impeachment 
proceedings against President Andrew Johnson.36 Johnson had 
refused to comply with the Tenure of Office Act,37 which required the 
consent of the Senate to discharge heads of Cabinet departments. 
Believing the requirement to be unconstitutional—a position the 
 
 32. As to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, see S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 272, 285 (1993). 
 As to DOMA, the constitutional issues were vetted in hearings before the House. The 
House Committee Report explicitly concluded that DOMA was constitutional and referenced 
the same conclusion of the Department of Justice, with some members filing a dissenting report. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 32–34, 36–45 (1996). At about the time that the bill passed the House, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings at which issues concerning the Act’s 
constitutionality were discussed, and, again, the administration’s view of the constitutional issue 
was noted. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). A Senate report on the bill does not appear to exist, but the floor debate before 
passage adverted to the constitutional issue and again to the Justice Department’s view. See, 
e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 22,437 (statement of Sen. Trent Lott) (“[President Clinton’s] Department 
of Justice has affirmed its position that H.R. 3396 ‘would be sustained as constitutional if 
challenged in courts.’”). 
 33. Although the bill enacted by Congress must have been presented to the president for 
his signature, even when a bill is enacted into law by congressional override of a presidential 
veto—so that the statute is truly the act of the legislature alone—the executive remains 
responsible for defending its constitutionality in court. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the 
Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 117 (1993). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 36. See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 456 
(1982). 
 37. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (repealed 1887). 
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Supreme Court upheld more than half a century later in Myers v. 
United States38—Johnson sought to remove Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton without senatorial consent.39 That action sparked his 
impeachment, and, during the proceedings, Boutwell declared that 
the president is obliged to execute all laws and lacks the power to 
refuse to execute those that he views as unconstitutional.40 
The same position has been advanced outside of that highly 
charged political setting, by such estimable scholars as Professors 
Edward Corwin and Eugene Gressman.41 On this view, a failure to 
enforce a federal statute violates the president’s duties under the 
Take Care Clause and can be seen as a presidential effort to assume a 
nonexistent power to repeal by fiat a validly enacted statute. These 
commentators suggest that although presidential objections to 
constitutionality may be registered by exercise of the veto, once a law 
is enacted—whether or not over a veto—any constitutional concerns 
must be set aside, and the law must be enforced.42 
That absolutist view, however, seems difficult to endorse, 
because the president must also take care to enforce the 
Constitution,43 which, of course, trumps conflicting statutes.44 More 
 
 38. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 39. HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 36, at 455. 
 40. See 2 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 73 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1868) (“The 
constitutional injunction upon the President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
and upon him no power whatsoever is conferred by the Constitution to inquire whether the law 
that he is charged to execute is or is not constitutional.”). 
 41. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 72 (5th 
rev. ed. 1984); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986). 
The similar view of Professor Christopher May is conveyed by the title of his article. See 
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 977 (1994); see also Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 
842 F.2d 1102, 1126 (9th Cir. 1988) (awarding attorneys’ fees after concluding that the 
government had acted in bad faith when the executive branch refused to enforce a statute that it 
believed encroached on executive power), withdrawn in part per curiam, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 
1989) (en banc). 
 42. CORWIN, supra note 41, at 72; Gressman, supra note 41, at 382–83. 
 43. A textualist might object that the Take Care Clause requires faithful execution of the 
“laws” but not the “Constitution,” while noting that in other clauses of the Constitution, most 
references to “laws” refer to acts of Congress. A list compiled by Professor Edward Swaine 
includes:  
[U.S. CONST.] art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (enabling Congress to direct census “by Law”); id. art. I, 
§ 4, cl. 1 (to regulate elections “by Law”); id. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (to set times of assembly 
“by Law”); id. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (noting that compensation for legislators is to be 
“ascertained by Law”); id. art. I, § 7 (describing presentment and other procedures 
before bill can become “a Law”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress power to 
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concretely, consider Judge Frank Easterbrook’s example of the 
executive’s response to Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s 
invalidating legislative classifications based upon sex.45 The U.S. Code 
was replete with such classifications.46 But defending each provision to 
the death until the Supreme Court struck it down would have been 
pointless.47 Nor would such an absolutist view comport with executive 
practice. The Justice Department has for many years refused to 
defend statutes when there is no reasonable argument for their 
constitutionality.48 And Congress appears to have acknowledged that 
practice, for it enacted a provision requiring congressional 
 
prescribe “uniform Laws” on bankruptcy); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (enabling Congress to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers and all other Powers”); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting any “ex post 
facto Law”); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (limiting expenditures to those appropriations “made 
by Law”). 
Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 342 n.64 (2008). 
Moreover, some constitutional provisions speak of both laws and the Constitution, see, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power to cases “arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties”); id. art. VI (mentioning both the Constitution and the 
laws of any State), which a textualist might take to mean that “laws” does not include the 
Constitution. 
 This argument shows little more than the limitations of textualism, for surely the 
obligation of the executive to comply with the Constitution is implicit in the constitutional 
structure. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally 
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 27 (2000). Moreover, another clause in 
the Constitution—Article II, Section 1, Clause 8, which prescribes the presidential oath—does 
expressly require the chief executive to pledge to preserve, defend, and protect the Constitution. 
See U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating that members of Congress and all executive and judicial officers 
of the United States, as well as their state government counterparts, “shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution”). 
 44. See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 
16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 31–36 (1992). 
 45. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a state law 
that set a different minimum age for men and women when purchasing certain beers); Frontiero 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a practice of determining 
dependency status in part based on sex). 
 46. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE (1977) 
(noting that “800 sections of the code . . . contained either substantive sex-based differentials or 
terminology inconsistent with a national commitment to equal rights, responsibilities, and 
opportunities”). 
 47. See Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 914. 
 48. See, e.g., Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 83–
84 (1976) (supplemental answer of the Dep’t of Justice) (“Where there is a patent inconsistency 
between the Constitution and an act of Congress, the Department, representing the United 
States, must argue that the Constitution prevail.”). 
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notification precisely when the executive fails to enforce or defend an 
act of Congress.49 
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that the president 
has the power—or, more extreme still, the duty—to refuse to enforce 
any statute that he judges to be unconstitutional, without regard to 
the views of Congress or the courts.50 This strong departmentalist 
view sometimes invokes the notion that because unconstitutional laws 
are void, the president may not enforce them as law.51 The difficulty, 
of course, is that the argument begs the question of whose judgment 
that a duly enacted law is void should control.52 Another argument for 
independent constitutional review rests on the presidential oath of 
office in Article II, which requires that the president pledge to 
“preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”53 But the oath 
argument proves too much. Article VI requires all executive officers 
to swear to support the Constitution,54 yet all of them are surely not 
obliged to apply their personal views of the Constitution, regardless 
of the views of their department head, of the Justice Department, or 
even of the president.55 And if executive officials may defer to the 
constitutional views of other executive officials, why can’t they defer 
to officials in other branches—that is, to members of Congress? After 
 
 49. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006) (requiring the attorney general to submit a report to 
Congress when, inter alia, executive officials establish a policy to refrain from enforcing a 
provision of an act of Congress, determine not to defend such a provision, or decide not to 
appeal a decision adversely affecting the constitutionality of such a provision). 
 50. Judge Frank Easterbrook appears to take the view that the president has the power to 
engage in independent review but does not suggest that he must do so in every case. See 
Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 922–23. Professor Saikrishna Prakash goes further, suggesting a 
presidential duty to disregard unconstitutional enactments. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
The Executive’s Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1682 (2008); see 
also Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 113, 122–23, 129 (2007) (contending that if the president has the power not 
to enforce an unconstitutional statute, exercise of that power is mandatory, not discretionary, 
and that whether or not he has a general power not to enforce, he is obliged to veto bills that he 
intends not to enforce). 
 51. Prakash, supra note 50, at 1616. 
 52. See CORWIN, supra note 20, at 5–6 (“[E]ither . . . everybody—including judges—has an 
equal right to determine what laws he is bound by, or else . . . nobody is bound by a law which 
has been held to be unconstitutional by proper authority, which of course leaves the essential 
question of the location of such authority undetermined.”). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also Prakash, supra note 50, at 1616. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. VI.  
 55. Cf. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two 
Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373, 374–75 (1994) 
(“[C]ould these officers refuse to carry out presidential orders, forcing the President at a 
minimum to pay the political costs of dismissing them?”). 
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all, federal judges, who also take an oath to support the 
Constitution,56 often defer to the political branches.57 
Much the same problem inheres in any claim that the Take Care 
Clause obliges the president to engage in independent constitutional 
review, for whether taking care to enforce the Constitution in a 
system of coordinated and separated powers permits deference to 
another branch is the very question before us.58 Indeed, Professor 
Michael Paulsen, perhaps the leading departmentalist, concludes his 
impressive analysis by urging the executive branch, in exercising its 
power of constitutional determination, to defer to the considered 
views of other branches, noting in particular that “[l]aw interpretation 
is what courts do for a living. They are supposed to be good at it.”59 
Having framed the broad debate about executive review, I turn 
to exploring the historic practice of the executive branch in enforcing 
and defending statutes to see how it illuminates this debate. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Executive-branch lawyers deal with constitutional issues 
frequently, and not merely, or perhaps even most often, in litigation. 
For example, a broad range of administrative decisions present 
constitutional questions; the Department of Justice routinely reviews 
the constitutionality of pending bills;60 law-enforcement and national-
security officials often have to consider the constitutionality of 
 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 57. See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1114 (1987); see also Strauss, supra note 34, at 117–18, 126–27 (arguing 
that the president’s power to disregard a statute may be limited by his duty to defer to the 
constitutional judgment of Congress). 
 58. See David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-
Enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 90 (2000) (“[A]n expansive conception of 
presidential authority . . . would be blind to the ways in which constitutional doctrine itself 
suggests that the scope of an institution’s interpretive authority is defined by a structure in 
which there are three branches sharing power rather than one branch exercising all of it.”).  
 59. Paulsen, supra note 19, at 332, 335. 
 60. Nina Pillard, a veteran of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), reports that in her 
experience, OLC reviewed every bill that the Justice Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs 
viewed as having a significant chance of passage. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise 
of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 711–12 & n.110 (2005); see also 
Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1709–12 (2011) (reviewing 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (“OLC’s 
core function is to provide formal legal advice through written opinions.”).  
MELTZER IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  2:18 PM 
2012] EXECUTIVE DEFENSE OF STATUTES 1197 
proposed actions;61 and demands from Congress for information may 
raise a range of separation-of-powers issues.62 In these and other 
settings, executive lawyers, most of whom are career lawyers,63 
generally do not engage in independent constitutional interpretation. 
Instead, they operate within the framework of established judicial 
doctrine64—at least as to matters that present justiciable questions.65 
Indeed, whatever the force of departmentalism in theory, it is difficult 
to imagine a comprehensive practice of independent executive 
constitutional interpretation. The executive branch simply lacks the 
capacity to create a parallel universe of constitutional determinations, 
tracking all the issues on which judicial precedents exist.66 Thus, 
although a great many scholars adhere to some form of 
departmentalism, that view has much less of a grip on government 
 
 61. See, e.g., CAROLINE D. KRASS, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, AUTHORITY TO USE 
MILITARY FORCE IN LIBYA 1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-
military-use-in-libya.pdf (discussing whether “the President had the constitutional authority to 
direct the use of force in Libya”); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case To Kill a 
Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A1 (describing an undisclosed memo from OLC that 
analyzed the constitutionality of using lethal force against an American citizen located in 
Yemen and asserted to be a cobelligerent of al Qaeda).  
 62. See, e.g., Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55–57 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(refusing to grant former White House Counsel Harriet Miers immunity from being compelled 
to testify before the House of Representatives about the forced resignations of nine U.S. 
attorneys in 2006 and addressing the “important separation of powers concerns” raised by the 
interbranch conflict). 
 63. See Pillard, supra note 60, at 708, 713. 
 64. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron 
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 408; Merrill, supra note 31, at 67–68; Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
President’s Power of Constitutional Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of 
Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 37 (1993); Pillard, supra note 60, at 683, 
703–04, 740–43. 
 65. An important feature of executive-branch lawyering involves questions, including 
constitutional questions, that are not justiciable, often in the separation-of-powers or foreign 
affairs areas. See Trevor Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1448, 1451 (2010) (“[B]ecause many of the issues addressed by OLC are unlikely ever to 
come before a court in justiciable form, OLC’s opinions often represent the final word in those 
areas . . . .”). 
 66. See Pillard, supra note 60, at 736–39. 
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actors—certainly and perhaps unsurprisingly on judges,67 but more 
importantly for present purposes, also on executive officials.68 
Like the courts, executive-branch lawyers are strongly influenced 
by precedent.69 It is thus highly relevant to note how very rarely the 
executive branch fails to enforce or defend acts of Congress. 
Consider, for example, that in the forty years from the start of the 
Nixon administration to the end of the George W. Bush 
administration, the Supreme Court invalidated roughly eighty federal 
statutes,70 while other federal statutes were invalidated in decisions 
never appealed to the Supreme Court.71 There can be little question 
that executive lawyers seriously doubted the constitutionality of a 
good number of these statutes—or that the president would have too 
had he been consulted. But several presidents and their 
administrations nonetheless enforced and defended the statutes in 
question. 
Thus, one can say in general that refusals by the executive 
branch to defend or enforce acts of Congress are extraordinarily rare. 
But they do occur, and the exceptions fall into several clusters. 
A. Statutes for Whose Constitutionality No Colorable Argument Can 
Be Advanced 
The most common basis for refusing to defend a statute is that 
no colorable argument that the statute is valid can be made. A well-
known example, Dickerson v. United States,72 involved a statute, 
 
 67. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 512 U.S. 507, 529 (1997); United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 704 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 
F.2d 1102, 1122 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part per curiam, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc). 
 68. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 18, at 106 (noting that the doctrine of judicial supremacy, 
rather than departmentalism, “is unquestionably the dominant view in United States law, 
politics, and society”).  
 69. See Morrison, supra note 65, at 1492–94; Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal 
Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1323–25 
(2000). 
 70. See generally S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 2117–59 (2004) (listing the seventy-four statutes 
invalidated by Supreme Court decisions from 1969 to 2002); S. DOC. NO. 110-17, at 163–64 
(2008) (listing the five additional statutes invalidated by the Court from 2002 to 2008).  
 71. E.g., Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 885 (2d Cir. 2008); Nelson v. La Crosse Cnty. Dist. 
Attorney, 301 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2002); Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 
1061, 1077 (10th Cir. 2001); Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991); Rothe 
Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 606 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2009); ACLU v. Mineta, 319 F. 
Supp. 2d 69, 86–87 (D.D.C. 2004); Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1049 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 72. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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enacted two years after the Miranda decision,73 providing that 
confessions in federal prosecutions are admissible if voluntary—
whether or not Miranda warnings had been administered.74 The 
Department of Justice, under a series of different administrations, 
had essentially disregarded the statute, apparently viewing it as 
inconsistent with Miranda.75 After one court of appeals nonetheless 
relied on the statute in ruling that a confession was admissible 
without regard to compliance with Miranda, the solicitor general 
refused to defend the statute before the Supreme Court,76 and the 
Supreme Court agreed that it was invalid.77 
Obviously, judgments about whether a colorable argument for a 
statute’s validity exists will sometimes be contestable. For example, in 
Dickerson, two dissenting Justices voted to uphold the statute.78 But 
however contestable particular judgments may be, the practice of 
refusing to defend a statute when colorable arguments cannot be 
mustered to support its constitutionality has been consistently 
followed by recent administrations and provokes little controversy.79 
B. Separation-of-Powers Cases 
The strong tradition of defending acts of Congress also does not 
extend to separation-of-powers cases—at least not to those that 
involve a conflict between legislative and executive powers. A 
distinguished former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Walter 
Dellinger, noted the executive’s “enhanced responsibility to resist 
unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional 
 
 73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 74. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).  
 75. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 463 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); United 
States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 681–82 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Eric D. 
Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1033–35 
(1998). 
 76. See Reply Brief for the United States at 1, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525), 2000 
WL 374574, at *1. 
 77. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. 
 78. See id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 79. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1083 (2001); see also, 
e.g., Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, supra note 48, at 5–6 
(statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice); Issues 
Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 50 (1990); Attorney 
General’s Duty To Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. 
O.L.C. 55, 56 n.1 (1980).  
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powers of the Presidency”80—a position that has been followed 
consistently by presidential administrations.81 
I have already discussed President Johnson’s refusal to enforce 
the Tenure of Office Act.82 A more recent example, notable because 
it may be the first time that the executive branch enforced a statute 
but then refused to defend its constitutionality in court, is United 
States v. Lovett.83 There, an appropriations statute enacted during 
World War II prohibited paying the salaries of three named federal 
employees.84 President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that he had felt 
obliged to sign the bill because it appropriated funds essential to 
government activities during the congressional recess, but that he 
thought the appropriations rider both infringed executive power and 
constituted a bill of attainder.85 When the employees sued for the pay 
they had been denied, the executive branch stated that it could not 
advocate with conviction the views of Congress and suggested that 
Congress should be represented by its own counsel, as it later was.86 
After the employees prevailed in the Court of Claims on grounds that 
did not address the broader constitutional issues, the Department of 
Justice filed a petition for certiorari, at the request of the special 
counsel for Congress, to permit the constitutional questions to be 
 
 80. Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994). 
 81. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 56, 64 (1933); Attorney General’s Duty To Defend the Constitutionality of Statutes, 43 
Op. Att’y Gen. 325, 325 (1981). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
 83. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
 84. Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450. 
 85. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement of the President Condemning Rider 
Prohibiting Federal Employment of Three Named Individuals (Sept. 14, 1943), reprinted in 1943 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 385, 385 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950) (“On July 12 I reluctantly signed H. R. 2714, the urgent Deficiency 
Appropriation Act, 1943. I felt obliged to approve it because it appropriates funds which were 
essential to carry on the activities of almost every agency of Government during the recess of 
the Congress. If it had been possible to veto the objectionable rider, . . . I should unhesitatingly 
have done so.”).  
 86. See H.R. REP. NO. 78-1117, at 3–4 (1944) (statement of Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. of 
the United States). Pursuant first to a house resolution, H.R. Res. 386, 78th Cong., 89 CONG. 
REC. 10,882 (1943) (enacted), and then to a joint resolution, see Joint Resolution of Mar. 4, 
1944, ch. 84, 58 Stat. 113, a special counsel was appointed to appear as amicus on behalf of 
Congress in defense of the statute. 
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resolved in the Supreme Court.87 In defense of that approach, the 
Department stated that Congress had no independent means of 
access to the Court.88 Before the Supreme Court, the Department of 
Justice’s lead argument was that the Act invaded executive authority; 
the bill-of-attainder objection, on which the Supreme Court 
ultimately rested, was distinctly secondary.89 
From one perspective, it may seem perverse that the executive 
departs from its strong tradition of defending acts of Congress in 
cases in which the executive could be seen as self-interested.90 But an 
adequate response, I believe, is that the executive branch cannot 
routinely enforce and defend a provision like the one in Lovett, for 
example, without leaving undefended the equally important interest 
of the executive in resisting legislative encroachments.91 Indeed, 
Justice Jackson’s celebrated concurrence in the Steel Seizure case,92 
while stating that presidential power is at its lowest ebb when 
executive actions are taken in contravention of congressional will, 
acknowledged that power to so act may nonetheless still exist.93 It is a 
fair implication of that acknowledgment that the president need not 
reflexively enforce and defend congressional encroachments upon 
executive authority, and that approach has been consistently followed 
in recent years.94 
 
 87. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (No. 809), reprinted in 44 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 5, 10 
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 2001).  
 88. Brief for the United States at 2, Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (No. 809), reprinted in 44 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87, at 52, 53. 
 89. See John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (1975). The statute at issue in Lovett has also been viewed as 
patently unconstitutional. See Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, 
supra note 48, at 6, 10 (statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice).  
 90. See Johnsen, supra note 43, at 51. 
 91. Notably, many of the historical sources, such as the Federalist papers, on which 
departmentalist commentators rely, are concerned with interbranch disputes. See, e.g., Paulsen, 
supra note 19, at 220–36. 
 92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 93. See id. at 634–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 94. For example, presidents have refused to defend such measures as the independent-
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601–602, 92 
Stat. 1824, 1867–74 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–598 (2006)), see Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 3, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
(1988) (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 1031600, at *5, and the legislative veto, see Brief for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service at 34, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-
1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171), 1982 WL 607220, at *35; Constitutionality of Congress’ Disapproval 
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C. Constitutional Doubts and Executive Defense 
For my purposes, the most interesting cases, though very few in 
number, are those in which the executive refuses to defend a statute 
that involves no incursion upon executive authority, even though 
colorable arguments for the statute’s constitutionality could be 
advanced. One such example arose during the George H.W. Bush 
administration. The Metro Broadcasting case95 challenged the 
constitutionality of the FCC’s granting minority preferences when 
awarding broadcast licenses.96 A 1982 amendment to the 
Communications Act of 193497 mandated such preferences in a 
different kind of proceeding,98 but in the matter at issue in Metro 
Broadcasting, the Act neither required nor forbade such preferences. 
Against that backdrop, the Department of Justice did not claim that 
the commission had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating 
the minority-preference policy. Moreover, Congress could be viewed 
as having ratified the policy when it subsequently enacted a series of 
appropriations riders barring the use of funds for the policy’s repeal 
or reexamination.99 Thus, the lawsuit necessarily challenged the 
constitutionality of the Federal Communications Act insofar as it 
authorized the promulgation of rules providing for a minority 
preference. Before the Supreme Court—in a brief signed by Acting 
Solicitor General John Roberts—the Department of Justice argued 
that the minority preference was unconstitutional.100 That did not 
leave the statute entirely undefended, as the FCC, an independent 
agency, filed briefs in the court of appeals and—with the 
authorization of the Department of Justice—in the Supreme Court, 
 
of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A Op. O.L.C. 21, 21–22 
(1980); Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1994, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1855, 1855–56 (Oct. 28, 1993); Memorandum from 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Apr. 7, 
1941), reprinted in Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 
1357–59 (1953). 
 95. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 96. Id. at 552. 
 97. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 98. See Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 115(c)(1), 96 
Stat. 1087, 1094 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (2006)) (requiring such preferences 
through the assignment by lottery of certain low-power stations). 
 99. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 11, Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547 
(Nos. 89-453 & 89-700), 1990 WL 505688, at *11. 
 100. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 7, Metro 
Broad., 497 U.S. 547 (Nos. 89-453 & 89-700), 1989 WL 1126975, at *7. 
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contending that the minority preference was valid.101 In the end, the 
Supreme Court upheld the minority preference in a 5–4 decision 
(although that decision was effectively overturned a few years later, 
also by a 5–4 margin).102 
In Metro Broadcasting, the Department of Justice may have been 
frustrated by rules established by an independent agency that the 
Department viewed as unconstitutional but over which neither it nor 
the president could exercise control. But it remains the case that the 
Justice Department, which ordinarily represents the FCC and other 
independent agencies before the Supreme Court,103 instead weighed in 
against the constitutionality, as applied, of a federal statute. And 
whatever one’s view on the merits, few observers would have 
contended that no colorable argument for the statute’s 
constitutionality could have been advanced in Metro Broadcasting.104 
Another decision to refuse to defend a statute that was not 
plainly unconstitutional arose in 1996 under a provision of an 
omnibus defense bill that required the discharge from the armed 
forces of HIV-positive individuals.105 President Clinton signed the bill, 
but then, after determining that the secretary of defense and the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the provision 
 
 101. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission, supra note 99, at 22, 1990 WL 
505688, at *22 (“The distress sale policy is within Congress’ broad power under the commerce 
clause and the fourteenth amendment.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting the Petitioner, supra note 100, at 1 n.2, 1989 WL 1126975, at *1 n.2 (stating that in 
view of the position of the United States, the acting solicitor general was permitting the FCC to 
represent itself in the Supreme Court through its own attorneys, and citing 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) 
(1988)). On the division of litigating authority between the FCC and the Justice Department, 
see Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency 
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 299 (1993). 
 102. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 103. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2006). 
 104. The Department of Justice, in urging the statute’s unconstitutionality, might have taken 
the view that the position it was advancing would help to uphold the constitutionality of other 
federal statutes—for example, the federal civil rights laws insofar as they bar discrimination 
against white citizens. If congressional power to apply those laws to such discrimination would 
otherwise be hard to establish—under, for example, the Commerce Clause or the spending 
power—then the Department of Justice might have argued that its position in Metro 
Broadcasting sacrificed an application of the Federal Communications Act to preserve 
applications of federal civil rights laws. But although the government’s brief alluded generally to 
the federal government’s interest in enforcing federal civil rights laws, it did not make the more 
focused argument just described. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
the Petitioner, supra note 100, at 1, 1989 WL 1126975, at *1. 
 105. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 567, 
110 Stat. 186, 328, repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707, 110 Stat. 1321, 
1321-330. 
MELTZER IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  2:18 PM 
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1183 
concerning HIV-positive service members served any legitimate 
interest, the administration announced that it viewed the provision as 
unconstitutional and would not defend it.106 As others have noted, the 
courts very possibly would have upheld its constitutionality.107 (In the 
end, Congress repealed the provision before the executive was 
required to take action, and thus the courts had no occasion to 
adjudicate the provision’s constitutionality.)108 
But one finds these two examples, and a very few others,109 
discussed repeatedly in the literature—and to this list, DOMA will 
 
 106. See Press Briefing, Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President & Walter Dellinger, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 9, 1996), available at http://
archives.clintonpresidentialcenter.org/?u=020996-press-briefing-by-quinn-and-dellinger-on-hiv-
provision.htm. 
 107. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 365, 382–83 (1998) (“[I]t would be difficult to claim that it would be irrational for 
Congress to conclude that treating HIV-positive individuals for combat injuries would require 
safeguards otherwise unnecessary, and that as a consequence their presence in combat units 
would complicate health care under combat conditions. Nondeployability inte [sic] combat units 
is an established basis for military classifications, and it seems doubtful that a court would have 
concluded that there was no ‘reasonably conceivable state of facts’ justifying Section 567’s 
discrimination.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 
(1993))); see also Johnsen, supra note 43, at 56 (“The HIV provision cannot be described as 
clearly unconstitutional under prevailing judicial precedent . . . .”). 
 108. See Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-330. 
 109. One instance dating back to the Kennedy administration is found in Simkins v. Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). In that case, the statute, unlike Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell or DOMA, did not directly regulate the operations of the federal government. 
Rather, a provision of the Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, ch. 958, 60 Stat. 
1041 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 291–291m (2006)), explicitly authorized the use 
of federal funds to support hospitals that provided separate-but-equal services to African-
Americans, id. sec. 2, § 622(f), 60 Stat. at 1043. In a private discrimination suit against private 
hospitals that received federal funds, the Department of Justice intervened on the plaintiffs’ 
side, arguing that the involvement of federal and state governments rendered the hospitals’ 
conduct state action and, therefore, a denial of equal protection—a position with which the 
court of appeals agreed. Simkins, 323 F.2d at 962, 970. 
 In League of Women Voters of California v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980), 
President Carter’s Department of Justice took the view that no reasonable argument existed for 
the constitutionality of a 1967 enactment prohibiting noncommercial television licensees from 
editorializing or endorsing or opposing candidates for public office, id. at 518. President 
Reagan’s Department of Justice disagreed and defended the measure, which the Supreme Court 
invalidated in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), after 
Congress had overridden President George H.W. Bush’s veto of the “must-carry” provisions 
requiring cable operators to carry local and noncommercial programming, the Bush 
administration refused to defend the statute, id. at 36. Whether the Department of Justice or the 
president believed that no colorable argument in favor of constitutionality could have been 
advanced is unclear. See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. 
MELTZER IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  2:18 PM 
2012] EXECUTIVE DEFENSE OF STATUTES 1205 
now be added—precisely because it is so extraordinarily unusual for 
the Department of Justice, outside of the separation-of-powers area, 
not to present colorable arguments in defense of a federal statute. 
Indeed, a notable example of the strength of the practice of defending 
acts of Congress involves the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970.110 During consideration of that measure, then-Assistant 
Attorney General William Rehnquist testified that there was “the 
most serious doubt” that Congress had the constitutional authority to 
lower the voting age to eighteen,111 and President Nixon’s signing 
statement set forth his unqualified belief that Congress lacked the 
constitutional power to do so.112 But in his Supreme Court argument 
in Oregon v. Mitchell,113 Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, after 
acknowledging those statements,114 proceeded to defend the 
provision.115 A similar sequence occurred three decades later: 
President George W. Bush expressed constitutional concerns about 
the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,116 but again, the Justice 
Department defended the Act’s constitutionality.117 
 
on the Judiciary (Mar. 22, 1996), reprinted in 1 J.L. 19, 26–27 (2011) (“[I]n the litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions, the Department of Justice, 
appearing on behalf of defendant FCC, informed the district court that it declined to defend the 
constitutionality of the must-carry provisions, ‘consistent with President Bush’s veto message to 
Congress.’” (quoting Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum in Support Thereof for the 
Issuance of a Revised Briefing Schedule in This Case and Its Related Cases at 2, Turner Broad. 
Sys., 819 F. Supp. 32 (Civ. A. Nos. 92-2247, 92-2292, 92-2494, 92-2495 & 92-2558))). When the 
Clinton administration took office, it defended the enactment, Brief for the Federal Appellees 
at 8–9, Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (No. 95-992), 1996 WL 435560, at 
*8–9; Letter from Andrew Fois to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, supra, which the Supreme Court 
upheld by a 5–4 margin, Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 224–25. 
 110. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 111. Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 233–49 (1970) (statements of William 
H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 112. President Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970, PUB. PAPERS 512, 512 (June 22, 1970). 
 113. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 114. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (No. 43, 44, 46 & 47), reprinted 
in 69 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87, at 619, 632–33 (“When [the bill] was 
pending before the Senate . . . Deputy Attorney General Henry Kleindienst appeared . . . and 
presented the view of the President that the . . . [bill] should be done by constitutional 
amendment. . . . And . . . Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist presented . . . a substantial 
statement against [the bill’s] constitutional validity . . . .”). 
 115. Id., reprinted in 69 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87, at 635.  
 116. President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503, 503 (Mar. 27, 2002). 
 117. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 113 (2003).  
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D. The Related Question of Positions in Amicus Briefs 
A closely allied question is the appropriateness of the 
Department of Justice’s taking a position in an amicus brief that 
would call into question the validity of one or more federal statutes. 
For example, in District of Columbia v. Heller,118 the United States’ 
amicus brief argued that the Second Amendment does confer an 
individual right to possess firearms unrelated to militia activities and 
refused to argue that the District of Columbia gun-control measure at 
issue was, in any event, a constitutionally valid response to the 
 
 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Department of Justice took a 
unique approach when defending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-
225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). President Nixon, in signing the original Act, had not expressed any 
constitutional concerns about the legislation. President Richard Nixon, Statement on Signing 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, PUB. PAPERS 165 (Feb. 7, 1972). Two years later, 
President Ford expressed his pleasure in signing a bill making significant amendments to the 
Act; he did then state a constitutional concern, albeit in a somewhat muted form: “And 
although I do have reservations about the first amendment implications inherent in the limits on 
individual contributions and candidate expenditures, I am sure that such issues can be resolved 
in the courts.” See President Gerald R. Ford, Statement on the Federal Election Campaign Act 
Amendments of 1974, 2 PUB. PAPERS 303, 303–04 (Oct. 15, 1974). 
Before the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice filed two briefs. The first, styled 
“Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission,” argued that the 
recording, disclosure, contribution, expenditure, and public-finance provisions of the Act did 
not violate the First Amendment. See Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election 
Commission, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437), 1975 WL 171459, at *37. In this 
respect, it was a typical government brief defending a statute. 
 The second brief, styled “Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae,” had two parts. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee 
and for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437), 
reprinted in 84 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87, at 383. The attorney 
general joined only the portion of the brief that argued that the Federal Election Commission’s 
powers intrude on the executive branch’s authority under Article II. With respect to a statute 
that the executive branch viewed as trenching on its constitutional authority, this, too, was a 
typical government brief, as is discussed in the next paragraph in text. On that separation-of-
powers issue, the FEC filed still another brief, on its own, supporting the constitutionality of the 
enforcement provisions. Brief of the Federal Election Commission, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 
75-436 & 75-437), reprinted in 84 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87 at 521. 
The remainder of the second Justice Department brief set forth the views of the United States 
on the First Amendment issues “as amicus curiae in the true sense of that phrase” and provided 
an essay analyzing both sides of the issues without taking a final position. Brief for the Attorney 
General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra, at 2, reprinted in 84 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 87, at 400. The extraordinary filing of two 
briefs on the same issue, one of which did not conclude that the statute was constitutional, 
surely signaled that the attorney general had very significant doubts about the Act’s 
constitutionality under the First Amendment.  
 118. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
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problem of handguns in high-crime urban areas.119 On both points, the 
opposite position was entirely plausible—it was in fact endorsed by 
four Justices120—and, if accepted, would have made the defense of 
existing federal gun laws easier. 
More notable still is the example of Brown v. Board of 
Education,121 in which the Brief of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae122 argued that racial segregation in schools was 
unconstitutional and that the doctrine of separate but equal should be 
overruled.123 Various acts of Congress at least presupposed that the 
schools in the District of Columbia would be segregated, and the 
District of Columbia’s brief in Bolling v. Sharpe124 took the view that 
these statutes mandated segregation.125 By contrast, the United States 
argued that the statutes could—and under the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, should—be interpreted as presupposing but 
not requiring segregation.126 Whatever the plausibility of the United 
States’ statutory interpretation, if that interpretation were rejected, 
the United States’ position on the constitutional matter surely 
undermined acts of Congress. 
In the amicus setting, unlike instances in which the government is 
directly sued, the government has the option of simply not filing a 
brief—although an invitation from the Supreme Court to the solicitor 
general to file a brief is very hard to refuse. And ordinarily, another 
party to the case has the opportunity to advance the constitutional 
position under which closely related federal statutes would be valid. 
But when the United States does choose to participate, it seems 
difficult to distinguish positions taken in amicus briefs from positions 
taken in government briefs in lawsuits that directly challenge the 
 
 119. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–10, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-
290), 2008 WL 157201, at *9–10 (arguing that the Second Amendment confers an individual 
right to bear arms, that regulations infringing on that right “warrant close scrutiny,” and that the 
regulation at hand “may well fail such scrutiny”). 
 120. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 121. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 122. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4 &10), 
1952 WL 82045. 
 123. Id. at 2–3, 17, 1952 WL 82045, at *2–3, *17. 
 124. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 125. Brief for Respondents at 12–14, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8), 1952 
WL 47280, at *12–14. 
 126. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 15, 1952 WL 82045, at 
*15. 
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constitutionality of federal statutes. The situations, if not identical 
twins, are at least first cousins. 
It is difficult to determine the number of cases in which the 
government has taken a position in an amicus brief that might 
undermine the defense of an existing statute.127 But I suspect that the 
practice is quite rare. Indeed, the United States’ amicus briefs often 
begin with a recitation that the federal government’s interest in the 
case pertains to defending and enforcing federal statutes,128 and that 
interest will ordinarily call for briefing that does not undermine the 
constitutionality of such federal enactments. 
III.  AN INSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF DEFENDING DON’T ASK,  
DON’T TELL AND DOMA 
Against that background of historical practice, I want to offer a 
perspective on the defense of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA that 
seeks to relate broad theories of constitutionalism to an important 
cluster of institutional practices and realities. From this perspective, 
the question of whether the executive should enforce and defend 
 
 127. To be sure, the notion that amicus briefs should not undermine federal statutes could 
make the government’s position depend upon the sequence of litigation. For example, in 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the United States argued that Nebraska’s partial-birth-
abortion ban was unconstitutional and that its enforcement could interfere with the ability of 
federal agencies to provide abortions to those for whose health care they are responsible. Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 
(No. 99-830), 2000 WL 340108, at *1. That position did not, to my knowledge, undermine any 
federal statute then on the books, as it predated enactment of the federal Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 
(2006)), which was later upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 The concept of avoiding arguments that undermine federal statutes has enough 
flexibility to accommodate reasonable concerns about effective advocacy and maintaining 
credibility with the courts. In the Heller litigation, for example, one cannot rule out the 
possibility that the solicitor general believed that the most effective way to uphold federal gun 
laws was to concede certain positions on which the government was unlikely to sway the 
majority, and thereby to establish the government’s credibility, on which it could later draw 
when arguing that various federal statutes raised distinguishable questions. See infra text 
accompanying notes 180–95. A skeptic might note, in response, the similarities between the 
government’s brief in Heller and the platform of the Republican Party. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L 
COMM., 2004 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL 
AMERICA 72 (2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/25850.pdf. 
 128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondent at 1–2, Ewing 
v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978), 2002 WL 1798896, at *1–2; Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 
377 (2000) (No. 98-963), 1999 WL 280452, at *1; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting the Petitioner at 1–3, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (No. 
83-1158) 1984 WL 566038, at *1–3. 
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these statutes is not the broad one of whether the president is a 
constitutional interpreter—for he must be—or whether he acts 
lawlessly when his constitutional views diverge from those of the 
courts—for he does not. Instead, the question is one of judgment—of 
the desirability, in view of an extant and reasonably stable set of 
institutional practices and expectations, of the president’s 
determining in a particular case that he will not enforce or defend a 
statute that is constitutionally dubious but that nonetheless can 
plausibly be defended. 
In this Part, I lay out a range of considerations that support the 
practice of enforcing and defending acts of Congress that the 
executive branch believes to be misguided, offensive, and quite 
possibly unconstitutional—in which category I would place DOMA 
and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. These considerations include the division 
of labor between executive and congressional lawyers, the 
relationship between career and politically appointed lawyers within 
the executive branch, the preservation of the Justice Department’s 
credibility with the courts, the avoidance of friction with Congress, 
and the maintenance of the integrity of executive officials subject to 
Senate confirmation. I also consider, but find wanting as a basis for 
enforcing but not defending DOMA and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
claims that the executive branch has a superior capacity to engage in 
constitutional interpretation. 
A. Protecting the Interests of Congress 
A first point that bears on this question draws on an established 
feature of our system already noted: the executive branch defends acts 
of Congress.129 It is sometimes said that if the executive refuses to 
defend, Congress may file a brief making the appropriate arguments. 
That is correct to a point, especially when a case reaches the Supreme 
Court130 or when the constitutional issue does not turn on the factual 
 
 129. Of course, unless enacted over a presidential veto, the acts are also in some sense acts 
of the executive.  
 130. In suggesting that enforcing—but not defending—a statute ordinarily places the 
constitutional issue before the court, former Solicitor General Seth Waxman appears to have 
been focusing on Supreme Court litigation. See Waxman, supra note 79, at 1078 n.14 (“[T]he 
practice of ‘enforce but decline to defend’ . . . allows the Executive Branch to make its views 
known to the Court . . . .”). In that context, an amicus brief from Congress may serve much the 
same function as a brief from the Department of Justice representing the United States and/or 
executive officials. 
MELTZER IN PRINTER PROOF (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/2012  2:18 PM 
1210 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1183 
record.131 But there are a variety of reasons why this alternative might 
fall short. 
In many cases—including particularly the challenge to Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell and, some might say, to DOMA—a court’s judgment 
about constitutionality might depend on the evidentiary record 
assembled in the district court concerning the strength or weakness of 
the asserted government interests. Remember, after all, the Brandeis 
brief.132 And it is uncertain whether Congress or one of its houses may 
intervene as a party or simply file a brief as an amicus and whether, if 
it may intervene, it enjoys all of the rights of a party at the district 
court level to depose and summon witnesses, gather and introduce 
documents, and the like.133 The Department of Justice has taken the 
 
 131. Metro Broadcasting, a case in which the litigation was based on the administrative 
record, furnishes an example. And in Lovett, although the case came to the Court of Claims 
without an agency record as such, the legal issues did not depend importantly on further factual 
development. 
 132. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 359, 362 (2009) (“[In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), Louis 
Brandeis, as counsel,] superintended a brief unlike any the Court had seen. It was to be loaded 
with facts and spare on formal legal argument. Its success would depend on the Court’s 
willingness to take judicial notice of a vast array of information outside the formal record of the 
case.”). 
 133. In Lovett, the solicitor general, in seeking certiorari on the question of the statute’s 
constitutionality, noted that he had been requested to do so by the special counsel appointed to 
represent congressional interests, so that the Supreme Court could decide the constitutional 
question. See supra text accompanying notes 83–89. The premise of that statement appears to be 
that although Congress could file an amicus brief should the solicitor general’s petition be 
granted, Congress could not on its own seek Supreme Court review. 
 In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), by contrast, the Senate and House authorized 
intervention in the litigation, and the court of appeals granted the motion to intervene. When 
the case reached the Supreme Court, on the question of intervention it said only that “[b]oth 
Houses are therefore proper ‘parties’ within the meaning of that term in [the statute governing 
Supreme Court review of cases in the federal courts of appeals].” Id. at 930 n.5. Some years 
later, however, in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), the Court denied that individual 
legislators challenging the Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), 
invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1988), had standing to vindicate an 
asserted injury to their authority or power, Raines, 521 U.S. at 814, 830. The Court did make 
something of the fact that unlike in Chadha, the houses of Congress had not authorized suit and 
had indeed opposed it, but whether those observations were determinative is unclear. More 
generally, the tone of the Raines opinion is broadly skeptical of judicial review of interbranch 
disputes in which no party claims individualized injury. Thus, whether the basis for intervention 
in Chadha remains good law—and if so, whether it is limited to cases in which (a) the 
substantive constitutional issue involves a separation-of-powers challenge to legislative 
authority, and/or (b) both houses of Congress have specifically authorized intervention—
remains to be seen. Moreover, intervention granted only on appeal—or in the district court, but 
only for purposes of briefing legal issues—may be a different matter from intervention at the 
trial level to engage in plenary litigation. 
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view that only the executive branch may represent the United States 
in litigation,134 or—in at least one filing after this Lecture was 
delivered—that any intervention by Congress should be limited to 
presenting arguments in defense of a statute’s constitutionality.135 
Moreover, if both the defendants, represented by the 
Department of Justice, and the challengers agree that a provision is 
unconstitutional, the contrary view, presented in a congressional 
brief, might not fully register with the courts. Some judges, much as 
they are unlikely in a criminal case to impose a harsher sentence than 
the government recommends, may be unlikely to uphold a statute 
that the Department of Justice, along with the plaintiffs, contends is 
unconstitutional. 
Finally, congressional defense of a statute—whether by 
intervention or merely by filing an amicus brief—is possible only if 
authorized in accordance with the varying procedures of one of the 
houses of Congress.136 Whether such authorization is provided will 
 
 Since this Lecture was delivered, at least one district judge and one magistrate judge 
have permitted the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) to intervene as a party in 
a challenge to section 3 of DOMA and have rejected the Justice Department’s suggestion that 
intervention be limited to presenting arguments in defense of the statute. Revelis v. Napolitano, 
No. 11 C 1991, 2012 WL 28765, at * 8–9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012); Windsor v. United States, 797 F. 
Supp. 2d 320, 323–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In its brief in Windsor v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 
320 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), BLAG cited quite a number of cases in which the House had been 
permitted to intervene. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Unopposed 
Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives To 
Intervene for a Limited Purpose at 3, Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (No. 10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ) 
(JCF)), 2011 WL 3164126, at *3. Nevertheless, some of these cases, such as Chadha, involved 
executive-legislative disagreements about the separation of powers, and in none of them did the 
congressional intervenor appear actually to have engaged in full-scale litigation in the district 
court, as distinguished from having defended the statute in connection with a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary 
judgment on a very limited record, such as affidavits. 
 134. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 117, at 116, reprinted in 84 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra 
note 87, at 514; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam) (noting that the 
conduct of civil litigation may be undertaken only by persons who are “Officers of the United 
States” under Article II’s Appointments Clause); Representation of Congress and Congressional 
Interests in Court, supra note 48, at 83 (statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“[T]he conduct of litigation in which the [U]nited States is 
interested should be reserved to the Department of Justice . . . .”). 
 135. See Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (“[T]he DOJ asks that BLAG’s involvement be 
limited to making substantive arguments in defense of Section 3 of DOMA while the DOJ 
continues to file all procedural notices.”). 
 136. Intervention or appearance as amicus curiae by the Senate Office of Legal Counsel 
must be authorized by a Senate resolution. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(c), 288e(a) (2006). In the House of 
Representatives, clause 8 of rule 2 of the House rules permits the speaker of the house, after 
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depend upon the political vicissitudes of the moment. In 2011, the 
House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, following a 3 to 2 party-line 
vote, did authorize filing a brief in defense of DOMA.137 But that 
group, which consists of three members of the majority leadership 
and two members of the minority leadership, might have decided 
quite differently if—as in 2009 and 2010—the Democratic Party 
controlled the House. For all of these reasons and more,138 
 
consulting with the BLAG, to direct the Office of General Counsel or special counsel to 
intervene on behalf of the House of Representatives. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted); 
see also 2 U.S.C. § 130f(a) (2006) (“The General Counsel of the House of 
Representatives . . . shall be entitled . . . to enter an appearance in any proceeding before any 
Court of the United States . . . .”). 
 137. Press Release, Representative John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality Is Determined by the Court 
(Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?
DocumentID=228585; Press Release, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Letter to Speaker 
Boehner on House Counsel Defense of DOMA (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://pelosi.house
.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-boehner-on-house-counsel-defense-of-
doma.shtml. 
 138. A final practical point relates to the possibility that there will be a multiplicity of 
lawsuits filed in which Congress would have to take up the defense. For example, each service 
member discharged under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, even if now eligible for reinstatement, might 
be able to bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 
1491 (2006), and the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204 (2006), seeking back pay in connection 
with a separation alleged to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 
1465–66 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Filipiczyk v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 776, 779 (2009); Loomis v. 
United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 505 (2005); Clifford v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 440, 441 (2004); 
Golding v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 697, 700–01 (2001); Milas v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 704, 
706, 710 (1999). In addition, the Court of Federal Claims recently ruled that it had jurisdiction 
to entertain claims by service members who were honorably discharged but whose separation 
pay was reduced from 100 percent to 50 percent because of their homosexuality. See Collins v. 
United States, No. 10-778C, 2011 WL 4937336 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 18, 2011). There is a six-year 
limitations period on actions in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2006); 
Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As a rough indicator of the 
order of magnitude of possible claims, more than 3000 individuals were apparently discharged 
under Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in the six years from 2005 to 2010. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don’t_ask,_don’t_tell#Discharges (last visited Feb. 14, 
2012). 
 As for DOMA, any litigant claiming a denial of benefits must point to a substantive law 
creating a right to monetary relief. One obvious right of action is under the tax laws, and same-
sex couples whose marriages are denied federal recognition may be disadvantaged under the 
estate tax or in some circumstances—notwithstanding the notoriety of the so-called marriage 
penalty—under the income tax. See, e.g., Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (estate 
tax); Pedersen v. OPM, 2011 WL 176764 (D. Conn. 2011) (income tax). The question whether a 
same-sex, married couple may file a joint petition for bankruptcy has also arisen in bankruptcy 
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 2011); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 
677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 In all such litigation, the executive would presumably concede the unconstitutionality 
of DOMA but might contest other issues, such as damages or whether the limitations period 
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congressional pinch-hitting will often not be a full substitute for 
defense by the executive. 
B. Institutional Continuity: Relationships Within the Department of 
Justice and Between the Department and Other Government 
Actors 
A second point bearing on the decision whether to defend—one 
implicated by both Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA—concerns 
institutional continuity. Each statute was signed into law by President 
Clinton after his Department of Justice concluded that it was 
constitutional.139 Both President Clinton’s and President George W. 
Bush’s Departments of Justice defended the laws in court, generally 
with success, and President Obama’s administration initially 
continued the executive branch’s policy of defense.140 A decision to 
 
had expired. Lawyers representing Congress could theoretically appear—at least as amicus—in 
all cases on the constitutional issues. Congressional legal offices, however, lack the staff to 
handle a large volume of litigation, and although Congress has authorized the hiring of private 
lawyers, see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 288 (2006), defending the government in large numbers of cases is 
not a traditional function of legislative-counsel offices. For example, in In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011), Congress obtained a short continuance to determine whether to 
intervene, but failed thereafter to file papers before the constitutional issue was decided, and in 
In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), Congress apparently made no effort to 
appear. 
 Plainly, requiring two sets of lawyers for the government in multiple cases is hardly an 
ideal arrangement. 
 139. As to DOMA, see Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (May 14, 1996), reprinted in Defense of 
Marriage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. app. at 243 (1996). As to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, see generally 
Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to President William J. Clinton, 
Defensibility of the New Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (July 19, 1993), 
available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/RenoMemo.htm. 
 140. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was upheld in Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Able v. 
United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); and 
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996). See also Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 
503 (2005) (upholding a similar Army regulation). The decisions in Cook and Loomis v. United 
States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503 (2005), postdated the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003).  
 In Witt v. Department of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008), the court held 
that the policy was subject to heightened scrutiny; on remand for a trial under that standard, the 
district court ruled that the policy was unconstitutional as applied, Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air 
Force, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1316 (W.D. Wash. 2010). A different district court held the policy 
unconstitutional in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 927 (C.D. Cal. 
2010), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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reverse course will inevitably lead to a charge that the incumbent 
administration is picking and choosing whether to defend statutes 
based on its policy preferences. 
Against that background, Attorney General Eric Holder, in his 
letter notifying Congress of the administration’s refusal to continue to 
defend DOMA, faced a burden of explanation for the Justice 
Department’s shift in policy. The letter stated that some 
“professionally responsible arguments” in defense of the statute were 
not reasonable,141 without offering any explanation of when that was 
so. One can imagine instances in which the claim seems correct. For 
example, the Department of Justice, as an institutional litigant, might 
hesitate frequently to advance “professionally responsible 
arguments” that a prior Supreme Court decision, under which a 
statute would be unconstitutional, should be overruled, for fear of 
undercutting its standing with the Supreme Court. That prudential 
concern might support a conclusion that it is not reasonable, in a 
particular setting, to present such an argument without implying that 
the argument fell outside the bounds of professional conduct. But 
 
 DOMA was upheld in Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005), 
aff’d, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); and In 
re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. D. Wash. 2004). 
 More recently, one district judge found DOMA to be an unconstitutional denial of 
equal protection, see Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010). In a 
companion case, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 
234 (D. Mass. 2010), the same judge reached the more dubious conclusion that DOMA also 
violates the Tenth Amendment, id. at 253. A second judge strongly suggested that the statute is 
unconstitutional. See Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (rejecting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); see also In re Levenson, 587 
F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing, in a nonjudicial administrative capacity, an internal 
discrimination complaint by an employee of the judicial branch and determining that DOMA is 
unconstitutional); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (invalidating 
California’s ballot proposition purporting to prohibit same-sex marriage), aff’d, Perry v. Brown, 
Nos. 10-16696 & 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). After this Lecture was 
delivered, the Bankruptcy Court of the Central District of California also held the statute 
unconstitutional. In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 569. 
 141. Letter of Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Representative John A. Boehner, supra note 9, at 5. 
Cases may exist in which the position taken by a set of Justice Department lawyers in the 
district court, upon fuller review by higher officials in the Department, is determined to be 
unconvincing. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 79, at 1080. But that would not seem to be a likely 
account of the change in position with regard to DOMA, given that numerous lawsuits were 
pending, the issue plainly was politically salient, and just six weeks before the attorney general’s 
announcement the government had filed a brief—presumably authorized by the solicitor 
general—in the First Circuit seeking to overturn the first district court decision striking down 
DOMA. See Corrected Brief for the United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
et al. at 24–58, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 
10-2214 (1st Cir. Jan. 19, 2011). 
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needless to say, that concern was not presented by DOMA. And the 
letter failed to explain why advancing plausible arguments for 
DOMA’s validity was unreasonable. 
As to the shift in the administration’s stance, the letter noted that 
past challenges to DOMA arose in circuits—for example, the First 
Circuit—whose precedents called for rational basis review of 
classifications based on sexual orientation.142 Two new lawsuits, 
however, had been filed within the Second Circuit, which lacked 
precedents on the standard of review.143 The administration was thus 
required, the letter continued, to identify the appropriate standard of 
review, which the department deemed to be heightened scrutiny—a 
standard under which the statute must fall.144 
The new lawsuits did present a thorny problem. For an 
administration unsympathetic to DOMA but engaged in defending its 
constitutionality, writing a brief stating that circuit precedent rejects 
heightened scrutiny145 is far easier than arguing against such scrutiny 
as a matter of first impression. But the proffered explanation for the 
shift in the executive’s position—that new lawsuits had been filed—is 
not convincing. 
The attorney general’s letter suggested that although the 
executive branch could fairly argue in the First Circuit that the 
rational basis test governed, it could not make that argument in the 
Second Circuit. To evaluate that reasoning, one must inquire what it 
means to have a plausible argument for a statute’s constitutionality. 
On one view, the mere fact that a precedent exists—that the First 
Circuit had applied the rational basis test to classifications based on 
sexual orientation—supplies a plausible argument, at least within that 
circuit. But a different, and I believe correct, view requires more; 
although a court’s reasoning deserves the most careful consideration, 
any particular judge or panel of judges may take a position that 
cannot be deemed plausible—either because of intervening 
developments or simply because it was dead wrong from the outset. 
Thus, the fact that a decision was rendered does not by itself establish 
that the legal position articulated meets any particular standard, 
however phrased, of legal correctness, acceptability, or plausibility. 
Much as a decision of a state court that rejects a constitutional claim 
 
 142. Letter of Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Representative John A. Boehner, supra note 9, at 1–2.  
 143. Id. at 1. 
 144. Id. at 2. 
 145. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60–62 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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is not deemed to be reasonable on federal habeas corpus review 
simply because the decision was rendered,146 so too a decision of a 
lower federal court upholding a statute or specifying a standard of 
review is not ipso facto plausible. 
Nor is a decision of one circuit an exercise of sovereignty over a 
particular region. Rather, it is an expression of what one regionally 
confined tribunal believes national law to be.147 Accordingly, the 
executive branch could properly rely on a First Circuit decision not 
only within that circuit, but also in new lawsuits filed within the 
Second Circuit—where, after all, the First Circuit’s decision remains a 
precedent, if not a controlling one. And, in any event, the attorney 
general’s letter ultimately backed away from a circuit-by-circuit 
approach, stating that the administration would no longer rely, even 
within the First Circuit, on a precedent calling for rational basis 
review—apparently on the ground that such a precedent was 
unreasonable.148 What was not convincingly explained was why the 
administration once considered that precedent to be reasonable but 
 
 146. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). 
 147. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 726 (1989). 
 In making this claim, I wish to account for the Supreme Court’s very interesting 
decision, handed down two months after this Lecture, in Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 
(2011). There, the Court stated that one court of appeals’ decision clearly establishes the law 
prospectively within that circuit, for purposes of assessing in future cases whether an official is 
entitled to qualified immunity from damages in a constitutional-tort action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006). Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032. Under Camreta, the availability of qualified immunity 
for the very same conduct could differ from one circuit to another, based on the state of circuit 
precedent. 
 Accepting that outcome does not derogate from the point in text. A court could take 
the view that there are functional reasons why officials should be required to be familiar with 
only a limited body of law, such as, for example, decisions of the Supreme Court and of their 
state supreme court or regional federal court of appeals. Immunity is a remedial doctrine that 
may appropriately have a heavy functional component. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 
1764–97, 1820–24 (1991). The Department of Justice has no corresponding functional reason to 
treat the merits of suits to enjoin a federal statute of nationwide applicability differently in 
different federal circuits—at least in cases, such as DOMA, in which no circuit court precedent 
so requires. And indeed, just a few days after the Camreta decision, in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 
S. Ct. 2074 (2011), Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in Camreta, suggested that the Court’s 
approach in that case would not necessarily apply in the same way to a federal official with 
nationwide responsibilities, id. at 2086–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 148. See Letter of Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Representative John A. Boehner, supra note 9, at 5 
(“[T]he Department in the past has declined to defend statutes despite the availability of 
professionally responsible arguments, in part because the Department does not consider every 
plausible argument to be a ‘reasonable’ one.”). 
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no longer did so. The mere filing of two additional lawsuits would not 
seem to change the relevant legal terrain. 
But put aside the question of consistency. Suppose the 
administration, immediately upon taking office, had refused to defend 
DOMA. Professor Walter Dellinger argues that no administration 
should have to ask a court to accept propositions that the president 
believes are fundamentally wrong.149 Hence, the argument goes, the 
administration would be justified in refusing to write a brief—as it 
would have had to do to vigorously defend the statute—contending 
that distinctions based on sexual orientation are not subject to 
heightened scrutiny, or that DOMA does not rest on animus against 
gay and lesbian individuals.150 
Professor Dellinger’s position has an obvious appeal; it does 
grate to have to say that a policy one believes to be offensive, deeply 
misguided, and probably unconstitutional should be upheld. Yet his 
position does not just threaten to cut deeply into any conception of a 
duty to defend; at some level, it is inconsistent with the idea that the 
defense of acts of Congress by the executive is a duty. Recall the 
examples noted earlier of two statutes that the Justice Department 
defended, even though the president who signed each into law, and 
who continued in office as constitutional challenges were being 
litigated, had publicly declared that he thought each was, or very 
likely was, unconstitutional.151 Just as the First Amendment truly 
counts not when protecting ideas that we agree with, but, in Justice 
Holmes’s famous phrase, when protecting “freedom for the thought 
that we hate,”152 so too the duty to defend counts when the executive 
branch defends acts of Congress that it views as offensive, of 
questionable constitutionality, or both. One hardly needs to invoke a 
duty to defend statutes that one applauds. 
Departing from that duty carries many costs, some subtler than 
others. Friction might arise between the Justice Department’s 
leadership and career lawyers who traditionally defend statutes 
whatever their personal views of the statutes’ constitutionality; the 
career lawyers might even start to wonder if they must agree with the 
positions taken in defense of the United States. Meanwhile, the 
 
 149. Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 111–17. 
 152. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929). 
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considerable credibility that the Department has with the courts, 
because of the consistency with which it fulfills its responsibilities, 
might be undermined if some judges view an administration’s failure 
to defend a statute—especially one that was successfully defended by 
prior administrations—as evidence of politicization. 
Any failure to defend might raise distinct problems within the 
relevant executive department. Here, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell provides 
a useful illustration. Executive departments do not necessarily fall 
into line with presidential wishes,153 and President Obama’s call to 
repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell did not gain immediate support in 2009 
from the Pentagon.154 Continuing to defend the statute in court, while 
working with Pentagon leadership to gather support for repeal, was 
critical to securing swing votes from members of Congress who were 
wary of voting to repeal if the military was not on board. Appearing 
to short-circuit the repeal process by playing a constitutional trump 
card could have undermined support for repeal in both the Pentagon 
and Congress. With the prospect of judicial invalidation uncertain, 
such a course would have risked leaving the discriminatory legislation 
in place for far longer.155 
Quite apart from its effect on repeal, a refusal to defend might 
bring a reaction from Congress that a president could rarely afford to 
ignore. In confirmation hearings, Justice Department nominees are 
regularly asked whether they will defend statutes. For example, in the 
hearing on her nomination to serve as President Obama’s Solicitor 
General, now-Justice Kagan pledged that she would continue the 
 
 153. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272 
(2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The First Word, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 27, 30 (2007). 
 154. Early in the Obama administration, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen were very publicly guarded in addressing 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Secretary Gates said, “If we do it, . . . it’s important that we do it right, 
and very carefully.” Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Cautious on Repeal of Ban on Gays in Military, 
N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS BLOG (Apr. 16, 2009, 6:23 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/04/16/gates-cautious-on-repeal-of-ban-on-gays-in-military (quoting Sec’y Gates) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Admiral Mullen stated, “I would need some time for a force that’s 
under a great deal of stress—we’re in our sixth year of fighting two wars—to look at if this 
change occurs, to look at implementing it in a very deliberate, measured way.” This Week with 
George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast May 24, 2009) (quoting Admiral Mullen) 
(transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7664072). 
 155. The point is not that enforcing and defending discriminatory statutes is always the best 
way to secure their repeal. The political calculus in each case will differ. Indeed, in the case of 
the HIV provision noted previously, see supra text accompanying notes 71–74, the announced 
refusal to defend resulted in repeal of the statutory provision before the time at which the 
executive would otherwise have been obliged to act. 
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tradition of defending all acts of Congress, except when they 
impinged upon executive authority or when no reasonable argument 
for their validity existed.156 Attorney General Holder made a similar, 
if somewhat less sharply defined, promise.157 Such pledges have 
commonly been made by Justice Department officials in past 
administrations.158 Against that background, a refusal to defend can 
undermine the credibility in Congress of key Justice Department 
officials,159 who may feel committed to adhere to these pledges as a 
 
 156. See Confirmation Hearings on the Nominations of Thomas Perrelli Nominee To Be 
Associate Attorney General of the United States and Elena Kagan Nominee To Be Solicitor 
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 47 
(2009) (statement of Elena Kagan) (“Traditionally, outside of a very narrow band of cases 
involving the separation of powers, the Solicitor General has defended any Federal statute in 
support of which any reasonable argument can be made.”). The future solicitor general’s view 
could be viewed as having an unspecified qualification, as she spoke of a presumption of 
defense, without indicating when that presumption might be overcome, but the tenor of the 
exchange suggests at the very least that there is a strong presumption in favor of defense. See id. 
(“And I pledge to continue this strong presumption that the Solicitor General’s Office will 
defend each and every statute enacted by this body.”). 
 157. Holder explained, “Well, that is now contained in a statute. The duty of the Justice 
Department is to defend statutes that have been passed by Congress, unless there is some very 
compelling reason not to.” Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee To Be Attorney General 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 112 (2009) 
(statement of Holder) (referring to civil-liability protections under the FISA Amendments Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 
50 U.S.C.)). Holder continued, “The Justice Department has as a matter of policy the obligation 
to defend Federal statues [sic]. I can’t think of a statute that my Department of Justice, should I 
be confirmed, would be more proud to stand behind.” Id. at 156 (referring to the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.)). 
 158. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of Larry D. Thompson To Be 
Deputy Attorney General and Theodore B. Olson To Be Solicitor General of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 132 (2001) (statement of Theodore 
B. Olson); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Ashcroft To Be Attorney General 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 141 (2001) 
(statement of John Ashcroft); see also Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 224 n.215 (1999); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, What’s a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush 
Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 410 (2008).  
 159. In the case of DOMA, then-Solicitor General Kagan had joined the Supreme Court 
months before the decision not to defend was made, and her eventual successor, Donald 
Verrilli, had been nominated but had not yet received a hearing on that nomination. Although 
Verrilli, who worked in the Obama Justice Department and White House, had been recused 
from working on DOMA, he nonetheless faced a barrage of critical questions during his 
confirmation hearing related to the administration’s decision to cease its defense of DOMA. 
Justice Department Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2011), available at http://www.senate.gov/fplayers/CommPlayer/commFlashPlayer.cfm?fn=
judiciary033011p&st=xxx. 
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matter not only of congressional expectation but also of personal 
honor.160 
Given congressional expectations, when the administration fails 
to present a colorable defense to a statute, broader legislative 
responses may be forthcoming. One could easily imagine oversight 
hearings—especially when one house is controlled by a party other 
than that of the president—attacking the Justice Department for not 
performing its duty; senators may threaten to hold up the 
confirmation of nominees to the Department of Justice or, indeed, for 
any executive post, in retaliation for the failure to defend the interests 
of Congress. With respect to the decision not to defend DOMA, such 
reactions quickly materialized.161 More broadly, whether such 
reactions occur; whether, when they do, they are more than pretexts 
for efforts to criticize or oppose the executive branch; and whether 
they cause serious difficulties all depend on the politics of the 
moment. But there is a clear potential for a regrettable increase in 
interbranch friction.162 
I acknowledge that, to a certain extent, the concerns I have 
raised derive from a premise that executive officials, members of 
Congress, and federal judges are not departmentalists and that they 
reject a robust view of executive constitutionalism—at least in the 
context of defending acts of Congress.163 One might object that if, as a 
 
 160. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United 
States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 106 (“I had sworn to defend capital punishment in my confirmation 
hearings, and I certainly was not going to go back on that.” (statement of former Solicitor 
General Drew S. Days III)). 
 161. For criticism of the attorney general during an appropriations hearing less than a week 
after the DOMA decision, see The FY 12 Department of Justice Budget: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 112th Cong. 73:30–77:55 (2011), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov/
webcasts.cfm?method=webcasts.view&id=09fe9fcf-221b-42ed-a363-64fa49c53ac9. Republicans 
added the DOMA decision to a list of reasons why they might oppose the confirmation of 
Deputy Attorney General James Cole. See David Ingram, Republicans Launch New Attacks on 
Deputy AG, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011, 12:13 PM), http://legaltimes.
typepad.com/blt/2011/03/republicans-launch-new-attacks-on-deputy-ag-james-cole.html. After 
this Lecture was delivered, Mr. Cole was finally confirmed in June 2011, more than a year after 
his nomination. For repeated criticism voiced during the hearing on the nomination of Verrilli 
to be solicitor general, see Justice Department Nominations, supra note 159. 
 162. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 125. 
 163. See, e.g., Justice Department Nominations, supra note 159 (statement by Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch); Constitutionality of GAO’s Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before a Subcomm. on the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Operations); Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, 
supra note 48, at 1, 8–9 (statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S. 
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matter of first principles, departmentalism is the correct approach, 
these concerns are beside the point. But I think it is a fact—perhaps a 
contingent fact, perhaps on some views a historically or normatively 
unjustified fact, but a fact nonetheless—that a court-centric 
understanding of constitutional interpretation is deeply entrenched in 
both government officials and the public.164 More important, that 
understanding is most deeply ingrained with regard to defense of 
statutes (as well as compliance with court orders). None of this means 
that a refusal to defend is normatively illegitimate. It does mean that 
the wisdom of such a decision must account for the institutional and 
attitudinal context in which it is taken. 
C. The Claims of Executive Superiority in Constitutional 
Interpretation 
There remains a narrower argument that might support a refusal 
to defend, or even to enforce, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in particular. In 
defending the Clinton administration’s refusal to defend the statute 
requiring discharge of HIV-positive service members, Professors 
Dawn Johnsen and David Barron both argue that the executive was 
better able to determine the constitutional meaning of equal 
protection in that context than the courts or Congress.165 They view 
the rational basis test, because it is rooted in the judiciary’s limited 
capacity to assess government interests,166 as underenforcing 
constitutional norms. As a result, the political branches, which can 
assess such interests expertly and nondeferentially, may find wanting 
what courts would validate.167 The executive’s constitutional 
judgment, the argument continues, was also superior to that of 
 
Dep’t of Justice); Letter from Benjamin Civiletti, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Senator Max 
Baucus (July 30, 1980), reprinted in Department of Justice Authorization and Oversight, 1981: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 871 (1980). 
 164. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (2001); 
Whittington, supra note 14, at 776–77. 
 165. See Barron, supra note 58, at 80. For a discussion of underenforcement and gaps 
between constitutional doctrine and constitutional meaning, see, for example, RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3, 37–38, 45–46, 111 (2001); Lawrence G. 
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212, 1264 (1988). 
 166. See Barron, supra note 58, at 79; see also Johnsen, supra note 43, at 42 (“The courts 
typically sacrifice some measure of their own best view of whether a statute is constitutional and 
apply a general presumption of constitutionality and the extremely deferential rational basis 
standard of review.”). 
 167. See Barron, supra note 58, at 77; Johnsen, supra note 18, at 115. 
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Congress—whether because Congress had not carefully considered 
the rationality of the HIV ban168 or because the president, as 
commander-in-chief, has a distinctive authority and capacity to 
evaluate the ban’s effect on the military.169 Thus, even assuming that 
the courts would uphold the measure, the executive could 
appropriately determine that it was unconstitutional.170 
A claim of comparative constitutional expertise does not fit 
DOMA well. No constitutional provision specifically recognizes the 
executive’s authority over employee benefits, and it is not obvious 
why the executive has greater expertise about that matter than 
Congress. Moreover, Attorney General Holder’s explanation hinged 
not on a claim of distinctive executive competence or an assessment 
of the strength of government interests but rather on his 
interpretation of judicial doctrine pertaining to heightened scrutiny.171 
Even as to Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, the claim of executive 
superiority is a bit muddled. Unlike the HIV ban, the Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell rule was determined to be constitutional by both political 
branches when it was enacted.172 Moreover, although by the end of 
2010, repeal had the support of a Pentagon study and the civilian and 
military leadership of the Defense Department,173 a significant 
minority of service members opposed repeal,174 and the army chief of 
 
 168. See Johnsen, supra note 43, at 57. 
 169. See Barron, supra note 58, at 95. 
 170. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 128–29. 
 171. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Representative John A. Boehner, supra note 9, 
at 2–5. 
 172. See supra notes 32, 139. 
 173. See The Report of the Department of Defense Working Group That Conducted a 
Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of Section 654 of Title 10, U.S.C., 
“Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces”: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Armed Servs., 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def.); id. at 9 
(statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
 174. For example, the Defense Department report survey data showed that although only 
21.2 percent of service members overall believed that unit readiness would be negatively 
impacted by the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, certain groups were more likely to perceive a 
negative impact, such as Army “combat arms,” 35.1 percent of whom thought readiness would 
be hurt. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” 68 tbl.7, 74 tbl.15 (2010), available 
at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28
secure-hires%29.pdf. Even within branches of the service, division existed. Whereas 31.8 
percent of Marines thought repeal would have a negative impact, that number climbed to 43.5 
percent when limited to Marine Corps “combat arms” alone. Id. at 74 tbl.15. 
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staff175 and the commandant of the Marines176 both publicly opposed 
repeal, at least at that time. Those minority voices do not make 
executive policy, but their existence makes it harder to claim that 
Congress could not have concluded that there was a rational basis for 
the statute. 
There remains the further question whether the executive’s 
interpretive capacity is superior to that of Congress with respect to 
military service by gay and lesbian individuals. The commander-in-
chief and the civilian and military leadership at the Pentagon clearly 
have relevant authority and expertise. But Congress also had long 
experience with the issue and, under Article I, possesses the 
constitutional authority to regulate armies and navies.177 In a not 
dissimilar context—when reviewing the statute requiring men but not 
women to register with the selective-service system—the Supreme 
Court downplayed the executive branch’s support for including 
women as a matter of equity and stressed instead that the grant of 
constitutional authority to regulate the land and naval forces is to 
Congress and not to the executive.178 Some may be unpersuaded by 
the Court’s argument, but it shows that comparative institutional 
advantage itself may be highly contestable. 
Moreover, insofar as an executive decision rests on a claim of 
institutional superiority, the logical response would seem to be not to 
enforce the statute at all, rather than to enforce it but then to refuse 
to defend it in court. Indeed, a refusal to enforce has the attraction of 
eliminating delay in the provision of benefits to those who the 
administration has concluded are the victims of unconstitutional 
discrimination. It also sidesteps the temptation to take what could be 
viewed as a half-measure—refusing to defend and securing whatever 
moral or political advantage might accrue from that refusal without 
really biting the bullet. To be sure, many view a failure to enforce a 
statute as a more radical step, as it could deny the courts the 
 
 175. See The Report of the Department of Defense Working Group, supra note 173, at 86 
(statement of Gen. George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army) (“Implementation of the 
repeal of DADT would be a major cultural and policy change in the middle of a war. . . . It 
would be implemented by a force in which a substantial number of soldiers perceive that repeal 
will have a negative impact on unit effectiveness, cohesion, and morale, and that 
implementation will be difficult.”). 
 176. See id. at 91 (statement of Gen. James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps) 
(“[M]y recommendation is that we should not implement repeal at this time.”). 
 177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13. 
 178. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 80 n.15 (1981). 
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opportunity to provide an authoritative judicial resolution of the 
constitutional issue.179 But insofar as an independent constitutional 
determination by the executive is premised on its superior 
interpretive capacity, it is puzzling why the executive should strive to 
ensure that ultimate interpretive authority is retained in the 
(institutionally inferior) courts. 
D. The Risk of Lackluster Defense and the Scope of the Duty To 
Defend 
Although I have sought to highlight the importance of 
maintaining the traditional duty to defend, those who believe not 
merely that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA should be defended 
but also that they are in fact constitutional might be wary about 
defense of those statutes by the Obama administration. Suppose that 
President Obama and Attorney General Holder held the 
constitutional views set forth in the attorney general’s letter, but did 
not direct the Department of Justice to cease defending DOMA. 
Professor Peter Strauss expresses doubt about whether the executive 
branch would defend a statute with adequate vigor if it harbored 
strong doubts about the statute’s constitutionality; indeed, he goes so 
far as to contend that if the president has concluded that a statute is 
unconstitutional, to take the opposite position in litigation would risk 
creating a friendly suit.180 
Although any generalization in this regard is hazardous, I believe 
that Professor Strauss’s assessment greatly exaggerates the risks. In 
 
 179. See Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 124, 127 (1996) (“While the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the Constitution 
cannot simply be equated with the Constitution, we are mindful of the special role of the courts 
in the interpretation of the law of the Constitution.”); see also Johnsen, supra note 43, at 41 
(“[P]residential non-enforcement decisions should reflect deference to Supreme Court 
precedent . . . . [O]n the whole, courts are better suited to the business of constitutional 
interpretation . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Pillard, supra note 60, at 734–36 (“According to 
[Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124], a 
substantively court-centered approach to executive constitutionalism applies, not only where 
there is settled Court precedent on point, but even where the Court’s existing doctrine is not 
determinative of the constitutional question.”). 
 Moreover, although a decision to refuse to enforce DOMA or Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
when the statutes were enacted might have precluded the courts from opining, that is not true if 
one administration’s decision not to enforce follows enforcement by earlier administrations. 
Often individuals harmed by these statutes in the past can sue for monetary relief, see supra 
note 105, which provides an opportunity for courts to decide the constitutional issues.  
 180. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not To Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 107, 119–20 (2000). 
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my time in the executive branch, career litigators, and the political 
appointees in the Department of Justice who were overseeing them, 
were energetic and effective in defending Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
DOMA, and many other statutes, notwithstanding obvious questions 
about the constitutionality of these statutes. And although I did not 
witness the defense of statutes after a presidential determination of 
unconstitutionality, that was the situation in Oregon v. Mitchell,181 in 
which the Justice Department’s defense of the challenged Act was 
partially successful.182 Similarly, in McConnell v. FEC,183 even after the 
president expressed serious constitutional doubts about the statute’s 
constitutionality, the Department’s defense was nearly entirely 
successful.184 Given the traditions of the career lawyers in the 
Department, I doubt that their vigor would flag in the face of such a 
presidential determination. 
But such accusations have been made about the Obama 
administration’s briefs in defense of DOMA during the period before 
the decision was made to cease defending the Act.185 In its briefs, the 
Department of Justice disavowed two of the interests that the 
congressional record suggested that DOMA supported: promoting 
effective child-rearing and encouraging procreation.186 The briefs 
noted that many leading medical, psychological, and social-welfare 
organizations had concluded, “based on numerous studies, that 
 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13.  
 182. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117–18 (1970) (holding that “Congress can fix the 
age of voters in national elections, such as congressional, senatorial, vice presidential and 
presidential elections, but cannot set the voting age in state and local elections”). 
 183. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); see supra text accompanying notes 116–17. 
 184. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 188–246 (invalidating two provisions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.), but rejecting or dismissing constitutional 
challenges to a large number of others). 
 185. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, 
Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 951, 970 (2010) (“[I]t would be inaccurate 
to say the Obama administration’s Justice Department presented a high quality or serious 
defense like previous administrations had given when defending DOMA in earlier cases.”); Ed 
Whelan, Obama’s Dive on DOMA, NAT’L REV. ONLINE BENCH MEMOS BLOG (Feb. 23, 2011, 
2:53 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/260523/Obama-s-dive-doma-ed-whelan 
(“[T]he Obama administration has been sabotaging DOMA litigation from the outset. Today’s 
action [ordering the Department of Justice to stop defending DOMA] at least has the modest 
virtue of bringing that sabotage out into the open.”). 
 186. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss at 19 
n.10, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 09-10309-JLT), 
2009 WL 5803678 (“In this case, the government does not rely on certain purported interests set 
forth on the legislative history of DOMA . . . .”). 
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children raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be well 
adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents”187 and that 
encouraging procreation was not a rational basis for limiting marriage 
to opposite-sex couples, given that, as Justice Scalia noted in dissent 
in Lawrence v. Texas,188 “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to 
marry.”189 The Department of Justice then articulated the main 
interest advanced by DOMA this way: in 1996, when same-sex 
marriage was nowhere recognized in the United States, Congress 
could legitimately maintain the status quo, providing benefits only to 
a form of marriage whose legitimacy was universally recognized, and 
could thereby ensure federal uniformity, pending further evolution in 
the states.190 
That shift in briefing strategy led to accusations that the 
Department’s defense of the statute was halfhearted.191 One 
commentator remarks that the later decision not to defend DOMA 
brought the administration’s sabotage of the statute out into the 
open.192 That assessment, if correct, would surely lend support to 
Professor Strauss’s concern. But I do not share that assessment. 
Given the dramatic change in public attitudes about gays and lesbians 
since DOMA was enacted,193 rationales that might have seemed 
forceful or at least rational in 1996 looked quite different in 2009. In 
my judgment, though colorable arguments for DOMA could certainly 
have been advanced, none of the asserted government interests—
neither those in the legislative record nor the one articulated by the 
Justice Department in 2009—were particularly robust. The 2009 
formulation has a bit of a tautological quality. Nonetheless, it was less 
vulnerable to being undermined as illogical, contrary to social-science 
evidence, or as evidencing impermissible animus than were the 
interests articulated in the legislative record in promoting 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 189. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 190. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, supra note 
186, at 17–18, 2009 WL 5803678. 
 191. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 185, at 970. 
 192. See Whelan, supra note 185. 
 193. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (reporting polling data suggesting that between 1996 and 
2011, the percentage of Americans who believe homosexual relations between consenting adults 
should be legal rose from 44 to 64 percent, while the percentage opposed declined from 47 to 32 
percent).  
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procreation, encouraging heterosexual marriage, and expressing 
moral disapproval.194 
Of course, not all lawyers would necessarily have followed the 
new briefing strategy; government lawyers in the George W. Bush 
administration did not disavow the interests set forth in the legislative 
record. There is ample room for debate about the best way to craft an 
effective defense of a statute that presents obvious constitutional 
vulnerabilities. But given the plausibility, and I would suggest, the 
lesser vulnerability of the 2009 formulation, I do not see the change in 
briefing strategy as providing support for Professor Stauss’s position 
or, more broadly, for suggesting that entrusting the defense of a 
statute to officials in an administration that might harbor widespread 
doubts about the statute’s constitutionality is perilous. 
A related but distinct question would reach beyond judgments 
about litigation tactics. One might take the view that a proper 
conception of the duty to defend requires the executive to advance all 
the government interests that Congress declared that the statute 
served, even if no one thought that strategy to be the most likely way 
to prevail. That view, however, seems implausible. Litigators 
routinely choose among arguments and jettison some that, even 
though permitted by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,195 they believe lack force or might undermine credibility. 
Unlike in private litigation, it is not feasible for the executive to 
consult a client (Congress?) to ascertain its wishes. But as in private 
litigation, it seems fair to assume that ordinarily the client’s chief 
objective is to prevail. Thus, I believe that the executive is more 
faithful in its responsibilities to Congress when it reshapes arguments 
in an effort to prevail than when it parrots the legislative record if 
doing so would seem to increase the risk of defeat. That is exactly, I 
believe, what the Obama administration’s Department of Justice did 
during the period in which it was defending DOMA. 
IV.  INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS AND GENERAL PRACTICES 
The question whether the president should defend or enforce a 
statute like Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell or DOMA is a complex one, and 
not everyone will be persuaded by my discussion either of particular 
 
 194. A fourth interest articulated by Congress—preserving governmental resources—
though not of overwhelming force by itself, continued to be relevant to the statute as defended 
by the Obama administration. 
 195. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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decisions or of any theory that might underpin such decisions. But I 
want to move the discussion to a higher level of generality, for I 
believe the most critical question is the attractiveness of a regime in 
which each administration views itself as having significant latitude to 
refuse to enforce and defend acts of Congress. And I think such a 
regime is likely to be less attractive than particular decisions or 
theories, for a very simple but important reason: different 
administrations are likely to have sharply different views about the 
appropriate occasions for, and the appropriate theories underlying, 
such decisions. 
At the level of individual decisions, I heard it said that if the 
George H.W. Bush administration would not defend what it viewed 
as invidious reverse discrimination in Metro Broadcasting, the Obama 
administration need not defend what it believes to be invidious 
discrimination against gays. And one can well imagine that the failure 
to defend DOMA could in turn be invoked as a reason for a future 
Republican administration to refuse to defend some other statute in 
the years ahead. 
What is true of particular decisions is also true of particular 
theories. Although not impossible, it seems unlikely that theories like 
those of Professors Barron and Johnsen, premised in part on a 
conception of underenforcement of individual constitutional rights, 
especially the right to equal protection,196 would commend themselves 
to a Republican administration.197 By the same token, such an 
administration might find itself more attracted to an entirely different 
view. Recall, for example, that the Reagan Department of Justice 
published a report declaring that “government attorneys should 
advance constitutional arguments based only on [the Constitution’s] 
‘original meaning’”;198 that Griswold,199 Roe,200 and Miranda201 were all 
wrongly decided; and that the taxing power does not permit purely 
regulatory taxes.202 A future administration could make decisions 
 
 196. See Barron, supra note 58, at 77; Johnsen, supra note 43, at 56. 
 197. To be sure, one could deploy such a theory in favor of a different set of rights—for 
example, First Amendment rights to contest campaign-finance legislation or the right to bear 
arms protected by the Second Amendment. 
 198. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION 3–4 (1988). 
 199. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 200. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 201. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 202. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 198, at 3, 10–11, 44. 
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whether to enforce and defend on the basis of those constitutional 
understandings.203 
The concern just voiced is a form of slippery-slope argument. 
Such arguments can be overused,204 they sometimes presuppose an 
unrealistic incapacity to draw plausible distinctions, and their 
empirical basis is often only guesswork.205 But the concern seems to 
me to be salient in the present context, in view of the potential 
interaction among several aspects of contemporary legal and political 
culture. First, the blossoming of constitutional theory has generated 
an extremely broad range of views about proper constitutional 
interpretation.206 Second, presidents may be tempted to equate what is 
misguided or immoral with what is unconstitutional; indeed, Justice 
Jackson said exactly that about FDR, a leader whom he served and 
greatly admired.207 Third, views about constitutional interpretation 
have partisan correlations.208 Fourth, the parties are increasingly 
polarized,209 and even if the policy issues of greatest concern to the 
public are rarely constitutional ones, a subset of constitutional issues 
 
 203. A strong policy of executive defense of acts of Congress does not ensure perfect 
stability in constitutional decisionmaking. It places broader authority in the courts, who may 
themselves shift course; after all, a key precedent in any challenge to DOMA or Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell, Lawrence v. Texas, overruled the Court’s earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986). But notwithstanding complaints about declining respect for stare decisis, 
see, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional 
Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, Precedents Begin Falling for 
Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at A21, shifts in judicial attitude occur far more 
slowly than shifts in the executive. When control of the White House passes from one party to 
another, typically the entire White House staff and Justice Department leadership change, but 
the Supreme Court remains as it is until a vacancy arises. 
 204. See F.M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA 7 (Dunster House ed., 
1923) (“The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent is that you should not now do an admittedly 
right action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not have the courage to do 
right in some future case, which, ex hypothesi, is essentially different, but superficially resembles 
the present one. Every public action which is not customary, either is wrong, or, if it is right, is a 
dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing should ever be done for the first time.”). 
 205. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 
1132–34 (2003). 
 206. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. 
CT. REV. 103, 127. 
 207. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 74 (2003). 
 208. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 391–400 (2011); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 554 
(2005); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
28, 113–15 (2004). 
 209. See Pildes, supra note 206, at 141. 
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may be politically salient because of their importance in particular 
electoral districts or with particular constituencies.210 Finally, the ideal 
of judicial restraint has been in retreat for many decades.211 Put those 
together, and it is not hard to imagine the slope as becoming rather 
slippery indeed. 
One other aspect of institutional practice is relevant in this 
regard. It is generally accepted that decisions to treat as 
unconstitutional a statute that is not obviously so should be made by 
the president personally, and in the case of politically salient statutes 
like DOMA and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, it is unrealistic to think that it 
could be otherwise. But presidential involvement, although it fosters 
accountability, also brings with it the political apparatus of the White 
House, which may not be dominated by legal values and which 
characteristically attends carefully to such concerns as interest-group 
pressures, relations with Congress, and electoral implications.212 I was 
privileged to serve a president with an uncommon knowledge of and 
commitment to constitutional principles, but in Madison’s famous 
words, “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.”213 
And I think a realistic appraisal of how presidents in general would 
be likely to make decisions whether to defend statutes would give rise 
to a less lyrical description of presidential constitutionalism than 
those often found in the literature. 
There remains the example of the government’s position in its 
amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education.214 I see no basis for 
questioning the government’s position in Brown, and I have stressed 
that presidential constitutionalism is not illegitimate. But if the same 
standards should govern positions taken in amicus briefs that 
undermine federal statutes, and if the government was correct in 
 
 210. For discussion, see Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—And the 
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5–24 (2006). 
 211. See Waxman, supra note 79, at 1074–75 (noting the sharp increase in the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of federal statutes in the late 1990s); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 
282–83 (2005) (“Comparative law scholars have occasionally examined the proclivities of 
different national courts toward activism. These efforts invariably rank the U.S. Supreme Court 
as world champion of activists.” (footnote omitted)); Pildes, supra note 208, at 142–44 
(suggesting that “judicial review has become more assertive over time”); David Strauss, Pop 
Con, LEGAL AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 60 (arguing that “the Supreme Court has figured out a 
way to pursue an aggressive agenda without incurring too much popular opposition”). 
 212. See Levinson, supra note 55, at 380. 
 213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 121–26. 
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Brown, why wasn’t it also correct in refusing to defend DOMA? To 
suggest that the nature of the problems differs risks being perceived 
as insensitive to the seriousness of contemporary discrimination 
against gays and lesbians. And yet Brown is an exceptional case, 
addressing the greatest deprivation of constitutional liberty—apart 
from slavery itself—that the United States has ever seen, one that 
included a virtually complete exclusion of the victims of 
discrimination from access to the political processes. Moreover, 
segregation critically affected national foreign-policy interests at the 
height of the Cold War,215 interests that might be thought to transcend 
the interest in defending statutory provisions that governed only the 
District of Columbia and that could be fully defended by its officials. 
In the end, once the legitimacy of presidential constitutionalism 
is acknowledged, any particular case presents a question of judgment. 
With Brown in mind, a defender of the government’s ultimate 
decision on DOMA might contend, among other things, that it is 
difficult to demonstrate that any particular refusal to defend will have 
deleterious consequences. But by the same token, it might be hard to 
show that it will not. And in this regard, the DOMA decision must be 
viewed as quite a broad precedent for executive discretion to refuse 
to defend. For the decision did not involve a range of features that 
might argue for permitting the executive to refuse to enforce or 
defend an act of Congress: DOMA was not passed over a presidential 
veto resting on a constitutional objection; the issue is not one—like 
military readiness—over which the president might be thought to 
have a special grant of constitutional authority and claim to expertise; 
the statute was not a relic from a different era, nor was it a brand new 
enactment that was quickly deemed to be indefensible; it had been 
defended by prior administrations, and the precedents regarding its 
constitutionality were anything but uniformly against the statute’s 
validity;216 the refusal to defend did not involve a failure, after lower 
court decisions, to seek Supreme Court review, a situation that 
requires the solicitor general to consider the Court’s limited docket;217 
the constitutional question did not depend upon statutory 
implementation by an independent agency that the president could 
 
 215. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 6, 1952 WL 82045, 
at *6. 
 216. See supra note 140. 
 217. See Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, supra note 48, at 6 
(statement of Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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not control and that remained free to file its own brief in defense; and 
Congress did not overlook the constitutional question when passing 
the bill.218 Thus, the precedent set by the refusal to defend DOMA is 
hardly a narrow one. 
I emphasize the matter of precedent for two reasons. First, in 
considering such questions, administrations are likely to start with a 
review of past practice, which commonly weighs heavily within the 
executive branch.219 Second, traditions like the duty to defend are not 
inevitable. Norms that seem to be well established can erode over 
time, as so much of our current political life illustrates. Thus, although 
I acknowledge the strength of the temptation to depart from the 
practice of defense in the case of DOMA, in my view, a great deal can 
be said for resisting that temptation and for seeking to maintain 
important norms whose fragility can easily be underestimated. 
V.  LITIGATION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES 
I have so far expressed views about the proper course of action 
for the executive branch in defending acts of Congress. But whether 
or not one finds those views persuasive, unless executive practice 
were to change radically, the executive branch will, with some 
regularity, find itself defending against challenges to statutes that the 
incumbent administration believes to be unwise and would like to see 
repealed. When such cases come before the courts, judges must 
provide adequate latitude to permit a vigorous defense to take place 
without requiring the administration to misrepresent its own views 
about the wisdom or desirability of the statutory policy. 
A hard problem arises in cases in which the official defendants 
are required to respond to discovery requests as to matters that could 
affect the outcome of the litigation, and about which they—and the 
administration they serve—have a view that is quite different from 
that of the Congress that enacted the statute. This very issue arose in 
litigation over Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell—well before its congressional 
repeal and well before the administration’s determination, in the 
DOMA context, that heightened scrutiny applies to classifications 
based on sexual orientation. President Obama stated, while in office, 
that he believed that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell did not contribute to, but 
 
 218. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 43, at 43–54 (discussing many of these factors in the 
context of decisions not to enforce). 
 219. See Morrison, supra note 65, at 1475–81 (detailing OLC’s treatment of precedent). 
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rather weakened, national security.220 In one of the suits challenging 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, the plaintiff cleverly filed a request for 
admission that essentially quoted the president, asking the defendants 
to admit that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell “does not contribute to” and 
“weakens our national security.”221 
Coming at a time when the executive branch was defending the 
statute, that request presented an obvious dilemma for the 
defendants. On the one hand, an admission would undermine what 
might have been the strongest possible defense of the statute: the 
claim that Congress could rationally have thought that Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell would strengthen our national security. On the other, a 
denial would have the defendants to the lawsuit—the United States 
and the secretary of defense—directly contradicting the position of 
the president. Accordingly, the Justice Department responded by 
admitting the request insofar as it sought the executive’s view and 
denying it insofar as Congress could rationally have had a different 
view.222 
That response, I believe, was an appropriate one for an executive 
branch trying to be faithful both to its commitment to defend 
congressional interests and to its obligation accurately to represent its 
views. The district court, however, sustained an objection to that 
response and required the government to “unqualifiedly admit or 
deny” the request for admission.223 The government came as close to 
its original position as it could without defying the judge’s order, 
explaining in prefatory comments the difference in perspectives 
between the two political branches and making clear the president’s 
view, but finally—when actually responding directly to the request for 
 
 220. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at a Reception Honoring Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Month, 1 PUB. PAPERS 927, 929 (June 29, 2009). 
 221. Plaintiffs’ Request for Admission at 3–4, Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 
F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV 04-08425-VAP (Ex)).  
 222. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Discovery Ruling at 4, Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 884 (No. CV 04-08425-VAP (Ex)), 2010 WL 2171536, at *4 (“The President’s 
statements set forth the Executive’s view that the statute does not contribute to national 
security and, indeed, that it weakens it. But it was the considered judgment of Congress in 1993 
that the statute was necessary for military effectiveness, and thus to ensure national security, 
and that statute remains in force today.”). 
 223. Order (In Chambers) at 3, Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (No. CV 04-
8425-VAP (Ex)) (granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ ex parte application for certain 
requests for admission to be deemed admitted); accord Minute Order Denying Defendants’ 
Motion for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Discovery Ruling (In Chambers) at 2, Log Cabin 
Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (No. CV 04-08425-VAP (Ex)). 
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admission—stating that the United States had no choice but to deny 
that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell does not contribute to and indeed 
weakens our national security.224 
The district court seems to me to lack justification for having 
required an unqualified response. In this context, it is important to 
distinguish between the role of lawyers defending statutes and official 
parties responding to discovery requests. It is understood that the 
brief of an advocate—whether for the government or a private 
client—does not reflect the personal views of the lawyer. By contrast, 
when litigants—whether government officials or private persons—
respond to inquiries posed in discovery, they are understood to be 
asserting their own views, truthfully225 and often under oath.226 
The price of vigorously defending statutes with which the 
administration disagrees should not be to require that government 
officials make representations—much less representations under 
oath—with which they disagree. If the Supreme Court was correct in 
New York v. United States227 that political accountability is diminished 
if the federal government can compel the states to take actions that 
the states would not otherwise take,228 so too political accountability 
would be diminished if the executive branch or an executive official 
were forced to announce—as its own view as a party—a proposition 
that it did not believe. Nor should the price of making honest 
representations under oath be to undermine the capacity of the 
executive branch to present the strongest possible arguments in 
defense of federal statutes. Thus, courts hearing challenges to acts of 
Congress that the administration believes to be unwise and possibly 
unconstitutional must understand the complexity of the executive’s 
role, and must provide the executive with the latitude necessary to 
fairly represent the potentially divergent positions of the two political 
branches. 
 
 224. Defendants’ Supplemental Responses to Requests 3, 4, and 5 of Plaintiff’s First Set of 
Requests for Admission at 3, Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (No. CV 04-08425-
VAP (Ex)). 
 225. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4) (“If a matter [in a request for admission] is not 
admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot 
truthfully admit or deny it.”). 
 226. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1) (depositions); id. R. 33(b)(3) (interrogatories). 
 227. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 228. Id. at 168. 
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CONCLUSION 
The mixture of theoretical and institutional considerations that 
bear on the appropriate role of the executive in defending acts of 
Congress makes the topic a rich but difficult one. The difficulties are 
sharpened for officials who find the policies embodied in Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell and DOMA to be pernicious and degrading. The attorney 
general’s letter made a plausible argument for heightened scrutiny, 
and even under a rational basis standard, the constitutionality of both 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA is open to serious question. 
The question whether under these circumstances the executive 
should continue to enforce and defend these statutes is not governed 
by a legal rule derivable from the Constitution itself; it is instead a 
matter of judgment, informed by a welter of historical and 
institutional concerns. In examining those concerns, I have tried to set 
forth a range of reasons why the executive branch should enforce and 
defend statutes such as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA—even 
when it views them as wrongheaded, discriminatory, and indeed as 
shameful denials of equal protection. 
